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 SELECTIVE DISCLOSURE BY FEDERAL OFFICIALS AND 
THE CASE FOR AN FGD (FAIRER GOVERNMENT 
DISCLOSURE) REGIME 
DONNA M. NAGY*  
RICHARD W. PAINTER**  
   
   This Article addresses a problem at the intersection of securities 
regulation and government ethics: the selective disclosure of market-moving 
information, by federal officials in the executive and legislative branches, to 
securities investors outside the government who use that information for trading. 
These privileged investors, often aided by political intelligence consultants, can 
profit substantially from their access to knowledgeable sources inside the 
government. In most instances, however, neither the disclosure nor the trading 
violates the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws (under which the 
insider trading prohibitions arise). This legally protected favoritism undermines 
investor confidence in the fairness and integrity of securities markets—and in 
government itself. Congress considered these harms in the debates leading up to 
the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act of 2012. But it 
wisely opted to study the role of political intelligence in financial markets before 
legislating further.  
   To address securities trading on the basis of selectively disclosed 
government information, this Article examines an analogous situation in the 
private sector that plagued individual investors until relatively recently. Selective 
disclosure of issuer information by corporate executives to securities analysts 
and professional investors had been regarded as blatantly unfair yet, in most 
instances, not illegal. Regulation FD, which the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) adopted in 2000, addressed this unfairness by looking 
beyond the construct of fraudulent tipping and trading under Section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder. The solution involved 
regulating the timing and manner of disclosures by corporate insiders, rather 
than the conduct of outsiders who gather and trade on the basis of those 
disclosures. Regulation FD embraced this approach for publicly traded 
companies and corporate executives have been adhering to it for more than a 
decade.  
   This Article proposes an analogous FGD regime—standing for Fairer 
Government Disclosure—that would prompt federal agencies, as well as 
members of Congress and their staffs, to deploy a variety of strategies that could 
substantially reduce the amount of selective disclosure of nonpublic government 
information to persons who are likely to use it in securities trading. The Article 
first gathers together press reports, agency and congressional correspondence, 
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and other materials that demonstrate the ubiquity of selective disclosure in the 
federal government. It then analyzes insider trading law to show that most of 
these instances of selective disclosure are not illegal. The Article concludes that 
the problem can be solved—or at least curtailed—with more effective internal 
controls on the federal officials who selectively disclose government 
information. It thus begins a discussion as to how such controls could be 
developed without compromising the quality and timeliness of disclosures to 
persons, including voters, who must have information in order to make 
informed decisions.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Information is said to be “the lifeblood of our securities markets”1 
and “the currency of democracy.”2 But when government officials 
selectively disclose market-moving information to certain privileged 
investors, leaks of this sort benefit neither markets nor democracy. 
Instead, ordinary investors and citizens lacking preferential access to 
the inside of government suffer a double blow: they lose out in the 
markets to securities traders with “unerodable informational 
advantages”3 and their playing field is skewed by government officials 
who should be serving the public at large rather than catering to the 
interests of a favored few.4 To be sure, government officials who use 
their positions to enhance the profit in their own investment portfolios 
undermine market confidence and the democratic process as well.5 But 
a government official’s own securities trading on the basis of material 
nonpublic government information falls squarely within the insider 
trading prohibitions arising under the antifraud provisions of the federal 
securities laws, namely, Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 
 
 1. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 
42,259, [1999–2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,228 (Dec. 20, 
1999). 
 2. The quote is often attributed to President Thomas Jefferson. E.g., 
National Information Infrastructure: Agenda for Action, 58 Fed. Reg. 49,025, 49,030 
(Sept. 21, 1993). 
 3. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658–59 (1997) (quoting Victor 
Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages under the Federal 
Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 356 (1979)). 
 4. See generally RICHARD W. PAINTER, GETTING THE GOVERNMENT AMERICA 
DESERVES: HOW ETHICS REFORM CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE (2009). 
 5. A recent series of investigative reports in the Washington Post has placed 
congressional officials and their investment practices into the public spotlight. See, 
e.g., David S. Fallis et al., Congressional Earmarks Sometimes Used to Find Projects 
near Lawmakers’ Properties, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2012, at A1; Dan Keating et al., 
Members of Congress Trade in Companies while Making Laws that Affect Those Same 
Firms, WASH. POST, June 24, 2012, at A1; Kimberly Kindy et al., Lawmakers 
Reworked Financial Portfolios after Talks with Fed, Treasury Officials, WASH. POST, 
June 25, 2012, at A7. These investment practices have also been scrutinized in a 
controversial book. PETER SCHWEIZER, THROW THEM ALL OUT: HOW POLITICIANS AND 
THEIR FRIENDS GET RICH OFF INSIDER STOCK TIPS, LAND DEALS, AND CRONYISM THAT 
WOULD SEND THE REST OF US TO PRISON (2011). 
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of 1934 (Exchange Act)6 and Rule 10b-5.7 In contrast, for reasons we 
shall explain, the selective disclosure of material nonpublic government 
information, or securities trading on the basis of that information, 
seldom constitutes fraud under these provisions.8 As the Supreme Court 
recognized more than thirty years ago, “not every instance of financial 
unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity under Section 10(b).”9 
Unfortunately, the selective disclosure of nonpublic 
market-moving information is a longstanding tradition in the federal 
government. In 1789, political allies and friends of the governing 
Federalists bought up federal and state Revolutionary War bonds that 
were trading at thirty-to-forty percent of face value.10 These extremely 
fortunate investors based their purchases on advance knowledge of 
then-United States Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton’s plan to 
pay the bonds at face value as a means of bolstering the United States’ 
credit rating.11 Ironically, in the first few days of August 2011, history 
may have repeated when officials—perhaps at Standard and Poors 
(S&P), but conceivably at the United States Treasury Department—
appeared to have selectively disclosed to some bond sellers the advance 
information that S&P would downgrade the credit rating of the federal 
 
 6. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006) (authorizing the SEC to promulgate rules 
prohibiting “manipulative or deceptive device[s] or contrivance[s]” in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security). 
 7. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011) (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . 
[t]o engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate 
as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security.”). Because Congress has not enacted a federal securities statute that explicitly 
prohibits securities trading on the basis of material nonpublic information, insider 
trading is generally illegal only insofar as it is fraudulent. For past Rule 10b-5 
prosecutions against federal officials for their own securities trading, see, for example, 
Cheng Yi Liang et al., Litigation Release No. 22,171 (Nov. 30, 2011), 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2011/lr22171.htm (announcing guilty plea and 
settlement of civil charges against former chemist with the United States Food and 
Drug Administration who garnered profits totaling more than $3.7 million from trading 
in pharmaceutical stocks based on confidential drug approval information); Acree, 
Litigation Release No. 14,231, 57 SEC Docket 1579 (Sept. 13, 1994) (discussing a 
former employee of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency who settled civil 
charges that he traded in securities of several bank holding companies while in 
possession of material nonpublic information); Saunders, Litigation Release No. 9744, 
26 SEC Docket 75 (Sept. 2, 1992) (announcing guilty plea and the settlement of civil 
charges against civilian employed by Navy who had purchased shares in a company that 
was about to be awarded a government contract). 
 8. See infra Part I.B.3.  
 9. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980) (citing Santa Fe 
Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474–77 (1977)).  
 10. See infra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.  
 11. See infra note 49 and accompanying text. 
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government from AAA to AA+.12 Three years earlier, federal officials 
knew more than markets did about what the Treasury would do—or not 
do—in response to the financial crisis of 2008 and they met frequently 
with Wall Street executives in their attempts to resolve the crisis.13 It is 
unclear how much nonpublic government information was disclosed, 
when, and to whom. But, to take just one instance, then-Treasury 
Secretary Henry Paulson is said to have privately briefed a dozen or so 
hedge fund managers and investment bankers on July 21, 2008, 
apparently revealing advance plans for a partial government takeover of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.14  
Over the past several years, financial journalists have catalogued a 
litany of other private briefings conducted by federal officials which 
very likely generated millions of dollars in trading profits for the 
privileged attendees or their clients.15 Notable briefings include those 
by executive branch officials at the Federal Reserve,16 the Pentagon,17 
the Department of Education (DOE),18 and the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services (CMS).19 A Wall Street Journal front page 
article in December 2011 then focused the public eye on Congress, 
revealing “a growing, lucrative—and legal—practice” that employs a 
network of persons who work with hedge funds and other professional 
investors to arrange private meetings with members and legislative 
staffers from both political parties, with the meetings often convened in 
the Capitol Building itself.20  
There is little doubt that Congress regards securities trading on the 
basis of selectively disclosed government information as a national 
problem that undermines investor confidence in the fairness and 
integrity of our securities markets—and in government itself. But for 
much of 2012, concerns about selective disclosure to privileged 
investors were relegated to the sidelines while Congress sought to 
 
 12. See infra notes 110–113 and accompanying text. 
 13. See Kindy et al., supra note 5. 
 14. See infra notes 83–87 and accompanying text. 
 15. See Eamon Javers, Washington Whispers to Wall Street: Low-Profile 
Firms Enjoy a Lucrative Business Selling ‘Political Intelligence,’ BUS. WK., Dec. 26, 
2005/Jan. 2, 2006, at 42; Brody Mullins & Susan Pulliam, Hedge Funds Pay Top 
Dollar for Washington Intelligence, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2011, at A1; Brody Mullins 
& Kara Scannell, Hedge Funds Hire Lobbyists to Gather Tips in Washington, WALL 
ST. J., Dec. 8, 2006, at A1; Jim Snyder, K Street Phones Wall Street: Political Inside 
Info for Hedge Funds Moves Stock Prices, HILL, Feb. 15, 2005, at 1. 
 16. See infra notes 88–92 and accompanying text. 
 17. See infra notes 95–100 and accompanying text. 
 18. See infra notes 103–106 and accompanying text. 
 19. See infra notes 107–109 and accompanying text. 
 20. Brody Mullins & Susan Pulliam, Inside Capitol, Investor Access Yields 
Rich Tips, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 2011, at A1. 
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clarify the law as it pertained to securities trading by its own members 
and their staffs. Fueled in large part by a claim in a 60 Minutes 
broadcast that congressional insider trading was “perfectly legal,”21 
momentum grew swiftly for congressional hearings22 and bipartisan 
legislation, which ultimately passed with landslide votes of 96-3 in the 
Senate and 417-2 in the House.23 On April 4, 2012, President Barack 
Obama signed into law the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge 
Act (the STOCK Act).24 The Act states explicitly that members of 
Congress and congressional employees, as well as all officers and 
employees in the executive and judicial branches of the federal 
government, “are not exempt from the insider trading prohibitions 
arising under the securities laws, including Section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b–5 thereunder.”25 It 
furthers specifies that for purposes of these antifraud provisions, all 
federal officials owe “a duty arising from a relationship of trust and 
confidence” to the U.S. government and its citizens “with respect to 
material, nonpublic information derived from such person’s 
position . . . or gained from the performance of such person’s official 
 
 21. See 60 Minutes: Congress: Trading Stock on Inside Information? (CBS 
television broadcast Nov. 13, 2011), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-
18560_162-57323527/congress-trading-stock-on-inside-information/ (stating in the 
episode summary: “For now, the practice is perfectly legal, but some say it’s time for 
the law to change”). 
 22. See Insider Trading and Congressional Accountability: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs, 112th Cong. (2011) (included witness 
testimony of Melanie Sloan, Donna M. Nagy, Donald C. Langevoort, John C. Coffee, 
Jr., and Robert L. Walker); The Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act: 
Hearing on H.R. 1148 Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. (2011) 
[hereinafter House STOCK Act Hearing] (included witness testimony of SEC Division 
of Enforcement Director Robert Khuzami, Jack Markell, Donna M. Nagy, and Robert 
L. Walker). 
 23. See Robert Pear, Insider Trading Bill Clears Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
23, 2012, at A13. Less than two months before, President Barack Obama had urged the 
Act’s passage. Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union, 
2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 47 (Jan. 25, 2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/ 
fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201100047/pdf/DCPD-201100047.pdf (“Send me a bill that bans 
insider trading by Members of Congress. I will sign it tomorrow.”). 
 24. STOCK Act, Pub. L. No. 112-105, 126 Stat. 291 (2012). 
 25. §§ 4(a), 9(b). Prior to the Act’s passage, securities law scholars had been 
engaged in a spirited debate as to the (il)legality of congressional insider trading. 
Compare Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading, Congressional Officials, and Duties of 
Entrustment, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (2011) (contending that members of 
Congress owe fiduciary-like duties to the federal government and concluding that 
congressional insider trading constitutes securities fraud under existing law), with 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading inside the Beltway, 36 J. CORP. L. 281, 285 
(2011) (concluding that “the quirks of the relevant laws almost certainly would prevent 
members of Congress from being successfully prosecuted”). 
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responsibilities.”26 The STOCK Act therefore affirms a duty of loyalty 
on the part of federal officials, which in turn provides the disclosure 
obligation that renders a federal official’s insider trading or tipping a 
fraudulent and deceptive act within the meaning of Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5.  
Although the STOCK Act eliminates any doubt that Section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 prohibit federal officials from defrauding the federal 
government “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security,”27 
the new legislation does nothing to alter the existing judicial 
construction of these provisions. Thus, contrary to views expressed by 
some securities lawyers, the STOCK Act does not ban government 
insiders “from divulging market-moving information to individuals who 
could trade on it.”28 Rather, the same doctrinal analysis that determines 
when tipping is fraudulent in the private sector now explicitly applies to 
the public sector.  
Through the late 1990s, however, the selective disclosure of 
material nonpublic information by securities issuers had been an 
intractable problem. For years, corporate executives routinely provided 
securities analysts and professional investors with material nonpublic 
information pertaining to their companies, including advance notice of 
earnings announcements, product developments, and corporate 
reorganizations.29 The privileged recipients of this information would 
use it in deciding whether to purchase or sell the issuer’s securities, or 
would pass the information along to hedge funds or other valued clients 
who were likely to trade.30 While securities analysts often published 
favorable reviews of the corporate officials who had doled out the 
issuer’s material nonpublic information, quid pro quos between 
securities analysts and chief executive officers (CEOs) or other 
executives were almost always avoided.31 
 
 26. §§ 4(b), 9(b) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(g) to (h) (2012)). The 
STOCK Act further specifies that members of Congress and congressional employees 
owe a duty to Congress itself. § 4(b).  
 27. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
 28. Brody Mullins & Andrew Ackerman, New Bill Clouds Legality of Tips, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 2012, at C1. 
 29. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 
43,154, [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,319, at 83,677 (Aug. 
15, 2000). 
 30. See id.  
 31. See generally Stephen J. Choi, Selective Disclosures in the Public Capital 
Markets, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 533, 551–52 (2002); Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, 
The Securities Analyst as Agent: Rethinking the Regulation of Analysts, 88 IOWA L. 
REV. 1035, 1054–61 (2003); William K.S. Wang, Selective Disclosure by Issuers, Its 
Legality and Ex Ante Harm: Some Observations in Response to Professor Fox, 42 VA. 
J. INT’L L. 869, 873–75 (2002); infra notes 287–290 and accompanying text. 
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This routine practice of selective disclosure by securities issuers 
had been viewed by many as “wrong, plain and simple,” to quote 
former Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chairman Arthur 
Levitt.32 But that practice typically did not trigger securities fraud 
liability because, according to the Supreme Court’s 1983 ruling in 
Dirks v. SEC,33 selective disclosure by a corporate executive constitutes 
fraudulent tipping only when that insider breaches a duty of trust and 
confidence owed to the issuer and its shareholders by benefitting 
personally, directly or indirectly, from the disclosure.34 Eschewing a 
broader construction of fraud that would reduce securities analysts’ 
incentives to conduct research, Dirks insisted that “the purpose of the 
disclosure” is key.35 Thus, absent their receipt of a personal benefit 
which would evidence disloyalty to the corporation and its 
shareholders, corporate executives could legally dribble out valuable 
information to a favored few. Likewise, because Dirks instructs that a 
tippee’s liability for securities fraud is derivative from that of the 
tipper’s,36 those fortunate analysts who received the selective 
disclosures could legally trade on that information or could advise their 
clients to trade. CEOs and other executives would almost always have 
legitimate corporate reasons for sharing material nonpublic information 
with analysts and other market professionals. And SEC officials were 
understandably reluctant to hang an illegal tipping or trading 
prosecution on the tenuous thread that positive coverage for securities 
issuers also inured to the personal benefit of their corporate insiders.37 
Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD),38 which took effect in October 
2000, eliminated the informational advantage traditionally possessed by 
securities analysts and their clients.39 The SEC accomplished this feat 
by creating new disclosure obligations on the part of SEC reporting 
companies (often termed “publicly traded companies”) which operate 
separate and apart from the antifraud provisions. These obligations 
effectively require publicly traded companies to release material 
 
 32. ARTHUR LEVITT, TAKE ON THE STREET 87 (2002).  
 33. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
 34. Id. at 661–62. 
 35. Id. at 662.  
 36. Id. at 659 (regarding a tippee as “a participant after the fact in the 
insider’s breach of a fiduciary duty” (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 
230 n.12 (1980)). 
 37. But see infra notes 295–305 and accompanying text (discussing the SEC’s 
settlement of a controversial enforcement action against Philip Stevens).  
 38. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2012).  
 39. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 
43,154, [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,319, at 83,680–81 
(Aug. 15, 2000).  
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nonpublic information to all investors at the same time. However, 
several exceptions, including a promise on the part of the recipient to 
maintain confidentiality, permit issuers to disclose information 
selectively. With Regulation FD on the books for more than a decade, 
Dirks’ “personal benefit” hurdle no longer serves to insulate the 
practice of selective disclosure by corporate executives at publicly 
traded companies.  
Regulation FD, however, hardly squelched the desire among 
professional investors for an informational edge in securities markets. 
When privileged access to material nonpublic information could no 
longer be provided legally by most securities issuers in the private 
sector, hedge funds and other institutional traders began to search out 
professionals who could gain access to other sources of market-moving 
information, including sources in the public sector. Although at one 
time these professionals with ties to the government were described in 
the traditional Washington vernacular as “lobbyists,” that label soon 
gave way to the term “political intelligence consultant.” Today, the 
political-intelligence industry is the booming $100-million-a-year 
business that set the stage for the hedge fund briefings by federal 
officials that are referenced above.40  
But, just as in the private sector, the Court’s decision in Dirks 
effectively insulates from securities fraud liability most instances of 
selective disclosure in the public sector. Indeed, federal officials 
typically can point to legitimate reasons for sharing nonpublic 
government information with outsiders, who often provide useful 
feedback and policy analysis. Thus, the SEC (or the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) in a criminal case) would rarely be able to demonstrate a 
federal official’s misuse of information in breach of a duty of trust and 
confidence, even under the broad misappropriation theory of insider 
trading liability, which the Supreme Court endorsed in United States v. 
O’Hagan.41 Like the link between favorable analyst coverage and 
preferential access to nonpublic reports by a corporate CEO, enhanced 
reputation and the mere possibility of future political support or 
campaign contributions are unlikely to be regarded as quid pro quos 
that constitute a federal official’s improper personal gain from the 
disclosure of material nonpublic government information.42 
 
 40. See supra text accompanying notes 15-20. For an extensive analysis of the 
industry’s escalating influence, see Bud W. Jerke, Comment, Cashing in on Capitol 
Hill: Insider Trading and the Use of Political Intelligence for Profit, 158 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1451 (2010). 
 41. 521 U.S. 642, 652–59 (1997); see also infra notes 138–141 and 
accompanying text.  
 42. See infra Part I.B.3. 
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Moreover, material nonpublic information pertaining to 
government and its operations implicates constitutional concerns 
because federal officials, particularly those in Congress, are obligated 
to discuss with constituents and other members of the public the 
important issues of the day. These discussions traditionally have 
received special protection under the First Amendment (and, for 
Congress, perhaps also under the Speech or Debate Clause43). Thus, 
even if many selective disclosures by federal officials theoretically 
could be construed as fraudulent tipping under prior Court precedents 
interpreting Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, constitutional considerations 
would typically dictate a narrower construction of those antifraud 
provisions.  
Because selective disclosure by securities issuers in the private 
sector and selective disclosure by federal officials in the public sector 
affect securities markets in a similar manner and escape insider trading 
regulation for much the same reason, a compelling case can be made 
for a comparable solution. Specifically, our Article proposes a new 
regime that would impose tighter internal controls on the ability of 
federal officials to advantage some investors over others in securities 
markets. We term this new regime FGD, which stands for “Fairer 
Government Disclosure.” An FGD regime would differ substantially 
from Regulation FD for publicly traded companies because it would 
reflect the vast size as well as the unique challenges and operational 
needs of the federal government. But like Regulation FD for publicly 
traded companies, an FGD regime for the federal government would 
focus on regulating “insiders and what they do . . . rather than on 
policing information per se and its possession.”44 
Our focus on selective disclosure by federal officials is particularly 
important and timely because, as a possible precursor to further 
legislative action, the STOCK Act requires the United States 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) to study and report to 
Congress on the role of political intelligence in financial markets.45 
Although each of us in prior writings has identified the need for a 
Regulation FD analogue in the public sector46 and passing references to 
 
 43. See infra notes 217–218 and accompanying text. 
 44. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663 (1983) (quoting In re Investors Mgmt. 
Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 648 (July 29, 1971)). 
 45. See infra notes 231–233 and accompanying text.  
 46. See PAINTER, supra note 4, at 171 (suggesting the possibility of a 
“Regulation FD for government,” but acknowledging difficulties with its design and 
implementation); Nagy, supra note 25, at 1163 n.320 (observing the parallels between 
selective disclosure in the public and private sectors and stating that a “Regulation FD 
analogue for elected officials is an intriguing possibility that warrants further 
consideration”).  
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the possibility have been made by others,47 this Article offers the first 
detailed analysis as to what an FGD regime for the federal government 
could look like. We proceed in three parts.  
Part I explores the role of political intelligence in securities 
markets and highlights instances, both historical and contemporary, of 
selective disclosure to privileged investors. It then explains why most of 
these instances fail to constitute fraudulent tipping within the meaning 
of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. We conclude by critiquing legislative 
efforts that go beyond the STOCK Act to require registration and 
reporting by political intelligence firms and to further amend the federal 
securities laws with a broad ban on securities trading on the basis of 
material nonpublic government information. Both types of proposals, 
though well intentioned, place unnecessary burdens on the private 
sector when the problem of selective disclosure calls out for more 
effective internal controls on federal officials.  
Part II shifts the focus to selective disclosure by securities issuers 
in the private sector and analyzes Regulation FD’s inventive solution to 
the problem. Part II also discusses important concerns that were raised 
by securities issuers, market professionals, and the media regarding the 
proposed regulation’s possible chilling effect on the flow of corporate 
information to securities markets, and it explains how the SEC 
managed to ameliorate most of the concerns about chilling in its final 
regulation. It concludes with a discussion of Regulation FD’s operations 
and effectiveness over the last decade.  
Part III explores the complexity of government disclosure and 
suggests some ways in which the federal government can create a more 
level playing field for all securities investors. As a starting place, we 
propose seven FGD measures that federal officials can adopt either 
 
 47. For example, the Project on Government Oversight (POGO), a 
nonpartisan watchdog group, recently published an article that queried: “Wouldn’t it be 
nice if the federal government and members of Congress also had to treat all investors 
equally, by adopting some public sector version of Reg FD?” Adam Zagorin, Wall 
Street in Washington: Insider Access, PROJECT ON GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT (Dec. 8, 
2011), http://www.pogo.org/pogo-files/alerts/government-corruption/wall-street-in-
washington-gc-ii-20111208.html. Even critics of the SEC’s decision to prohibit 
selective disclosure by securities issuers have questioned the public sector’s lack of 
restraint. See, e.g., Stephen Bainbridge, Why Isn’t the Federal Reserve Subject to 
Regulation FD?, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Nov. 23, 2011), 
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2011/11/why-isnt-the-
federal-reserve-subject-to-regulation-fd.html (pointing out that “[i]f the policy against 
selective disclosure makes any sense, it ought to apply to the Fed as much as to private 
issuers”); Larry Ribstein, Congressmen as Securities Traders, TRUTH ON THE MARKET 
(Mar. 13, 2011), http://truthonthemarket.com/2011/03/13/congressmen-as-securities-
traders/ (Congress can “[p]rotect against corruption by mandating disclosure not only 
of trades but also tips. In other words, as little as I like Regulation FD, there might be 
some benefit to imposing something like it on Congress.”).  
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individually or through directives issued by agency heads and 
congressional committees. We also begin a discussion as to how fairer 
government disclosure can be implemented and enforced more 
comprehensibly, without compromising the quality and timeliness of 
disclosures to persons, including voters, who must have information in 
order to make informed decisions.  
I. SECURITIES TRADING BASED ON SELECTIVELY DISCLOSED 
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION 
Since the days of its founding, the federal government has served 
as a gold mine for material nonpublic information that could affect the 
stock price of publicly traded corporations. The recent growth of the 
political intelligence industry, however, leaves little doubt that this 
mine is being tapped with increasing fervor and regularity. Although 
selective disclosure by federal officials generally does not constitute 
fraudulent tipping under the federal securities laws, the practice can and 
should be curtailed. But each of the two types of proposals suggested 
thus far—registration and disclosure requirements for political 
intelligence consultants, and an explicit ban on securities trading on the 
basis of nonpublic government information—attacks the problem from 
the wrong direction.  
A. The Role of Political Intelligence in Securities Markets 
1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND  
While attention to the role of political intelligence in U.S. 
securities markets is relatively new, investment profits from the use of 
such intelligence can be traced back at least as far as 1789. At that 
point in history, the First Congress had been poised to approve 
Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton’s plan to redeem at face value 
Revolutionary War bonds, which were issued by the Continental 
Congress and the states.48 With advance notice of Hamilton’s plan (an 
effort intended, in large part, to boost the new federal government’s 
 
 48. See Richard W. Painter, Ethics and Corruption in Business and 
Government: Lessons from the South Sea Bubble and the Bank of the United States (U. 
Minn. L. Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 06-32, 
2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=920912 (published as the 2006 Fulton 
Lecture in Legal History by the University of Chicago Law School) (citing RON 
CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 225 (2004); STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, 
THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 112–21 (1993)). A recent newspaper article also recounted 
this incident. Kimberly Kindy, Congressional Rules on Trading Had Their Start in 
1789, WASH. POST, June 23, 2012, at A14. 
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credit rating), political allies and friends of the governing Federalists 
bought large quantities of federal and state bonds, which had been 
trading at thirty-to-forty percent of their face value.49 Senator William 
Maclay of Pennsylvania, a Democrat, opposed Hamilton’s debt 
proposal and the insider trading that went along with it.50 Most of his 
ire was directed at colleagues in Congress who themselves traded on 
the information that the Treasury had provided to them.51 But Maclay 
made it clear that many speculators on the outside were also trading on 
the informational advantage that other investors lacked. As Maclay 
wrote in his journal: “Mr. Hazard has followed buying [bond] 
certificates for some time past. He told me he had made a business of 
it; it is easy to guess for whom. I told him, ‘You are, then, among the 
happy few who have been let into the secret.’ He seemed 
abashed . . . .”52  
Maclay was recounting his conversation with Jonathan J. Hazard, 
Rhode Island’s delegate to the Continental Congress in 1788, and 
Maclay had no doubt that “all commotion originated from the 
Treasury.”53 Maclay’s journal further reveals that prior to their bond 
purchases, many of the speculators met with members of Congress in 
an attempt to influence the outcome of the vote on whether to approve 
Hamilton’s plan.54 Accordingly, in the words of a modern historian, 
“[t]he evidentiary record points toward the conclusion that the first 
market for government securities was created by interested parties with 
special information.”55  
Congress, when it created the Department of the Treasury, 
responded to this bond trading scandal with a statute, apparently aimed 
at Hamilton. The statute, which is still in force today, provided that the 
Secretary of the Treasury and the Treasurer may not “be concerned in 
the purchase or disposal of any public securities of any State, or the 
United States” while in office, and that an officer who violates this 
provision shall be fined “three thousand dollars, and shall . . . be 
 
 49. See Painter, supra note 48. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See id. 
 52. JOURNAL OF WILLIAM MACLAY: UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM 
PENNSYLVANIA 1789–1791 at 174 (Frederick Ungar Publishing 1965) (1890).  
 53. Id. at 175. 
 54. Id. at 323 (“[T]he assumption [of the continental debt and of the states’ 
debts] was forced on us to favor the views of speculation. . . . The whole town almost 
has been busy at it; and, of course, all engaged in influencing the measures of 
Congress.”). 
 55. Howard M. Wachtel, Alexander Hamilton and the Origins of Wall Street 
10 (1996) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=15091.  
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removed from office, and forever thereafter incapable of holding any 
office under the United States.”56 The provision was intended to 
prevent these two Treasury officials from “speculating in the public 
funds.”57 The use of the statutory language “concerned with” could be 
construed to cover tipping as well as trading by the Secretary and the 
Treasurer, although the reach of the statute has never been tested in 
court. The statute, however, said nothing about members of Congress 
speculating in Treasury securities or tipping others, nor did it directly 
address selective disclosure of Treasury Department information to 
securities investors.  
Between 1789 and the present day, federal officials have been in 
possession of enormous amounts of material nonpublic information 
about government operations and decisions. On some occasions, 
market-moving information specifically designated as confidential has 
been clandestinely leaked in the course of schemes that amounted to 
bribery, such as in 1869, when famed speculators in gold apparently 
paid a Treasury official $10,000 for inside tips as to the timing of gold 
sales from the federal government’s own stash.58 Other notorious 
tipping scandals are discussed in the Section that follows,59 including a 
1905 incident at the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
involving confidential cotton crop estimate reports that were leaked to 
commodities traders.60 The USDA scandal even prompted specific 
 
 56. Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, 1 Stat. 65, 67 (1789) (codified at 31 U.S.C. 
§ 329 (2000)). 
 57. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 635 (1789) (statement of the bill sponsor, Rep. 
Aedanus Burke).  
 58. See KENNETH D. ACKERMAN, THE GOLD RING: JIM FISK, JAY GOULD, AND 
BLACK FRIDAY, 1869 (1988). As Ackerman explains, the famed speculators used 
President Ulysses Grant’s brother-in-law, Abel Corbin, to persuade the President to 
appoint a Civil War hero, General Daniel Butterfield, as Assistant Secretary of the 
Treasury. See id. at 75–76. Butterfield’s job was to sell the federal government’s gold 
into the trading markets. See id. at 93. Not only did the speculators pay Butterfield to 
provide them with advance information as to the government’s anticipated sales, but 
they also used Grant’s brother-in-law to persuade the Administration to delay the sale of 
its gold. See id. at 95. The speculators then started buying, driving up the price of 
gold, expecting to sell in advance of the government. See id. at 95–96. President Grant 
and his Treasury Secretary, however, got wind of the scheme and ordered an abrupt 
sale of $4 million in gold into the market, with a contemporaneous press release. See 
id. at 186–87. The gold market plunged from $160 to $133 in a single day (now known 
as “Black Friday”), which precipitated a broad-based market panic, followed by a 
lengthy economic recession. Id. at 184–91. Congress subsequently investigated this 
gold conspiracy and Butterfield claimed that his $10,000 payment had been an 
unsecured real estate loan. See id. at 77. 
 59. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 60. See infra notes 128–133 and accompanying text (discussing Haas v. 
Henkel, 216 U.S. 462 (1910)). 
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“lock-up” procedures at the agency designed to control the premature 
release of confidential crop estimate reports.61  
But many parts of the federal government do not take lock-up or 
similar precautions to guard against the selective release of confidential 
information and, in any event, much nonpublic market-moving 
information has not been explicitly designated as “confidential.”62 
Accordingly, toward the last two decades of the twentieth century, the 
gathering of “political intelligence” from the federal government for 
stock trading purposes was on its way to becoming a sophisticated 
industry. In the 1980s, for example, the stock arbitrageur Ivan Boesky 
is reported to have “hired a team of lobbyists in Washington to tell him 
if Congress would block Standard Oil Co.’s takeover of Gulf Corp.”63 
When Boesky was told that this merger would be approved, he 
purchased stock and profited mightily. Although he later pled guilty to 
a role in one of Wall Street’s biggest insider-trading scandals 
(embroiling a host of investment bankers and lawyers who were 
effectively selling their client’s confidential information to Boesky and 
other traders), neither Boesky nor his government sources were ever 
prosecuted for “tips received in Washington.”64  
2. THE POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE INDUSTRY  
As the 1990s came to a close, those lobbyists who specialized in 
gathering information concerning legislative and regulatory 
developments began to be termed “political intelligence consultants.” 
These specialized consultants soon expanded into a thriving industry, in 
large part because of the growth of hedge funds, which are particularly 
aggressive in seeking out private meetings with federal officials for the 
purpose of gathering information for trading.65 In addition, when 
Regulation FD brought the private sector’s routine practices of selective 
disclosure to a halt after 2000, hedge funds and other professional 
 
 61. See RICH ALLEN, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., SAFEGUARDING AMERICA’S 
AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS: A CENTURY OF SUCCESSFUL AND SECURE PROCEDURES, 
1905–2005 at 1–2 (2007); infra notes 403–405 and accompanying text (discussing steps 
taken by federal agencies to prevent premature release of market-sensitive data).  
 62. See PAINTER, supra note 4, at 63–65.  
 63. Mullins & Scannell, supra note 15. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See PAINTER, supra note 4, at 167–69 (discussing the proliferation of 
hedge funds with operations in and around Washington D.C., presumably set up for the 
purpose of acquiring and trading on nonpublic government information); Javers, supra 
note 15; Jerke, supra note 40, at 1471–74 (discussing the “[r]ise of [p]olitical 
[i]ntelligence [g]athering”); Mullins & Pulliam, supra note 15; Mullins & Scannell, 
supra note 15; Snyder, supra note 15.  
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investors began to focus more attention on market-moving nonpublic 
information from the public sector.  
There is no doubt that the ability to deliver political intelligence 
commands big money. Less than a year ago, it was reported that 
“[t]housands of political insiders are being paid by hedge funds, 
private-equity firms and other big investors,” resulting in a  
“$100-million a year business in Washington.”66 Some clients pay 
Gerson Lehrman, often depicted as the largest so-called expert network 
firm, “up to $240,000 a year for unlimited access to the Washington 
experts.”67 The political insiders employed by these networks, lobbying 
firms, or law firms, as well as those consultants who work 
independently, are typically former officials in executive departments 
or agencies or former staffers on Capitol Hill, although many retired 
members of Congress also serve as political consultants.68 
Up until the 60 Minutes episode that fueled the STOCK Act’s 
passage,69 providers of political intelligence were not at all bashful 
about their services. For example, the law firm Sonnenschein Nath & 
Rosenthal once boasted on its web site: “While Congress negotiated 
significant pension reform legislation behind closed doors, our clients 
relied on our political intelligence gathering to inform them of the 
resolution of key outstanding issues that could affect their 
investments.”70 This advertisement emphasized the value of the firm’s 
political intelligence gathering not for legal work or lobbying, but for 
investing. As the firm’s then-chairman underscored, “[t]here are a lot 
of savvy investors who have realized that there is a lot of money to be 
made from what Congress does.”71 Many other D.C. law firms and 
consulting firms have highlighted their political intelligence activities 
 
 66. Mullins & Pulliam, supra note 15.  
 67. Id. 
 68. See, e.g., Kristin Jensen et al., Hedge Funds Hire Lobbyists for Inside 
Tips on U.S. Legislation, BLOOMBERG (March 16, 2005), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aYbb6sQ4HmGc&refer=us (observing that 
former-Senator John Breaux, “a Louisiana Democrat, is one of a growing cadre of 
lobbyists being hired by U.S. hedge funds to provide instant tips on the progress of 
potentially market-moving legislation”); Brody Mullins, Wall Street, Washington, and 
Gingrich, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 13, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052970203721704577156814083892408.html (reporting that former-House 
Speaker Newt Gingrich arranged private meetings in May 2011 between analysts at 
Credit Suisse Group and senior Republican congressional health-care policy staffers). 
 69. See 60 Minutes, supra note 21.  
 70. Jerke, supra note 40, at 1471 (internal citation omitted).  
 71. Mullins & Scannell, supra note 15 (quoting Elliot Portnoy who, according 
to the article, was elected as Sonnenschein’s chairman partly based on the performance 
of the firm’s political intelligence practice, which he founded). 
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and have spoken with the media about their clients.72 As one firm’s 
principal candidly acknowledged, hedge funds “are not paying me to 
lobby,” they are “paying me for information.”73 Foreign investors, 
including governments, also can get access to market-moving 
information from the federal government by buying a Washington D.C. 
political intelligence firm, as a government-run Chinese finance 
company apparently did in 2005.74 Because they are not seeking to 
influence legislation, political intelligence firms and consultants 
currently do not have to register under the Lobbying Disclosure Act 
(LDA),75 but that could change in a year’s time once the GAO 
completes its report to Congress on the role of political intelligence in 
financial markets.76  
3. SELECTIVE DISCLOSURES PROFILED IN THE MEDIA 
Several examples of selective disclosure that have been profiled in 
the media confirm the ubiquity of political intelligence activity. In 
2005, for instance, the SEC launched an informal inquiry into possible 
selective disclosures pertaining to a speech made by then-Senate 
Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-Tenn.).77 The speech announced his 
support for legislation that would have created a $140 billion trust fund 
for asbestos liability claims.78 The SEC’s concerns were prompted by 
noticeable spikes in trading volume and stock prices—in the two days 
prior to the speech—for several companies with substantial exposure to 
asbestos lawsuits.79 Press reports posited that hedge fund traders had 
obtained advanced information about the Majority Leader’s speech 
 
 72. See Jerke, supra note 40, at 1473 (discussing examples of advertisements 
and media interviews involving “Patton Boggs LLP, Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal 
LLP, Washington Analysis, Podesta Mattoon, Cormac Group, Mehlman Vogel 
Castagnetti Inc., Bryan Cave Strategies LLC, DLA Piper, Williams & Jensen, and 
Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP”).  
 73. Jensen et al., supra note 68 (quoting former legislative aide Jonathan 
Slade, a principal with the Washington-based Cormac Group).  
 74. See Javers, supra note 15, at 42 (reporting that Washington Analysis was 
sold in July 2005 “to China’s Xinhua Finance, which is 6.5%-owned by the 
government-controlled Xinhua News Agency”).  
 75. Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. § 1601 (2006). 
 76. See infra Part I.C.1. 
 77. See Mullins & Scannell, supra note 15 (reporting that the SEC “is looking 
into whether laws are being broken somewhere in the transfer of information between 
Congress and Wall Street”).  
 78. Id. 
 79. See Jerke, supra note 40, at 1453–55 (explaining that W.R. Grace, Crown 
Holdings, and USG Corporation “had used asbestos materials in manufacturing and that 
had been mired in litigation for years”). 
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from political intelligence firms, who obtained that information from 
congressional insiders.80 Although no one was ever charged with 
violating the insider trading or tipping prohibitions arising under 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and many relevant facts remain 
unknown, much can be gained from exploring a counterfactual. The 
timing and the substance of Senator Frist’s speech may not have been 
explicitly confidential pursuant to a formal rule, internal policy, or 
other mandate, but it almost certainly constituted material information 
(i.e., there was a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would 
consider it important in making an investment decision81) as well as 
nonpublic information (i.e., it had not been disclosed “to achieve a 
broad dissemination to the investing public generally”82). Thus, even if 
an SEC inquiry had revealed the selective disclosure of material 
nonpublic information, the principal legal question for the agency 
would have been whether congressional insiders misappropriated this 
information from the federal government by sharing it with political 
intelligence consultants and their clients who traded securities. As we 
shall see, the answer to this misappropriation question turns on whether 
the congressional insiders can be said to have misused material 
nonpublic congressional information for an improper personal benefit. 
Another much-publicized example of government selective 
disclosure occurred in July 2008, when Treasury Secretary Henry 
Paulson is reported to have met privately with several hedge fund 
managers and investment bankers and to have shared advance plans for 
a partial government takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.83 What 
 
 80. See Mullins & Scannell, supra note 15; Javers, supra note 15, at 42 
(stating that “the news got to key Wall Street players a day early via . . . a small group 
of firms specializing in ‘political intelligence’ that mine the capital for information and 
translate Washington wonkspeak into trading tips”).  
 81. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988). Moreover, when 
information is “soft” or contingent, its materiality is to be judged by “a balancing of 
both the indicated probability that the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of 
the event” in light of the totality of facts and circumstances. Id. at 238 (quoting SEC v. 
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc)). For further 
discussion of materiality and its interplay with a so-called mosaic theory, see infra note 
348 and accompanying text. 
 82. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653 n.12 (1983) (quoting In re Faberge, 
Inc., 45 S.E.C. 249, 256 (May 25, 1973)). The Second Circuit has also recognized that 
information may be deemed public, even though it is known only by some in the 
market, if securities trading “has caused the information to be fully impounded into the 
price of the particular stock.” United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 601 (2d Cir. 
1993). For further discussion of when information is “nonpublic,” see infra notes  
339–344and accompanying text.  
 83. Richard Teitelbaum, How Paulson Gave Hedge Funds Advance Word of 
Fannie Mae Rescue, BLOOMBERG MKTS. MAG., Nov. 29, 2011, available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-29/how-henry-paulson-gave-hedge-funds-
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he said at this meeting apparently differed in tone and substance from 
his public statements that these two companies would not be taken 
over.84 It is not clear why Secretary Paulson had the meeting or 
believed it important to reveal the information. Nor is it clear whether 
any of the attendees did, in fact, trade securities on the basis of the 
information.85 But it does not appear that anyone at the meeting had 
been instructed not to trade.86 As the SEC did with the possible 
selective disclosures relating to Senator Frist’s planned asbestos speech, 
it appears that the agency is now investigating securities transactions by 
the firms that were represented at the meeting with Secretary Paulson.87  
 
advance-word-of-2008-fannie-mae-rescue.html (reporting that “[a]round the conference 
room table were a dozen or so hedge-fund managers and other Wall Street executives—
at least five of them alumni of Goldman Sachs”). 
 84. See id. (reporting that Paulson described “a possible scenario for placing 
Fannie and Freddie into ‘conservatorship’” and stating that one hedge fund attendee 
“was shocked that Paulson would furnish such specific information—to his mind, 
leaving little doubt that the Treasury Department would carry out the plan”).  
 85. See id. (explaining that it is not possible to track firm-specific short stock 
sales using public documents, although the SEC can track at least some short stock 
sales).  
 86. See id. (positing that those attending the meeting were “given a choice 
opportunity to trade on that information”).  
 87. See Juliet Chung & Jean Eaglesham, Global Finance: Trades after 2008 
Meeting Probed, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 2012, at C3 (reporting that Taconic Capital 
Advisors “notified investors last week that it received a subpoena related to the meeting 
. . . [and that the firm] believe[d] that its conduct has been proper in all respects”). As 
infra Part I.B elaborates, in the absence of evidence of an agreement by the firms to 
retain the confidentiality of the information revealed at the meeting or a history, 
pattern, or practice of sharing such confidences with Secretary Paulson, Rule 10b-5 
almost certainly would not have prohibited the firms from trading securities (assuming, 
of course, that Paulson did not personally derive an improper benefit from any of this 
selective disclosure to the firms). That said, if investment bank or hedge fund 
employees had used the alleged disclosures about Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac for 
personal gain in connection with their own securities trading (as opposed to trading for 
the benefit of the bank or hedge fund), those employees could possibly be subject to 
Rule 10b-5 liability under the misappropriation theory for defrauding their employer 
and its clients or investors. See Rosenberg, Litigation Release No. 12986, 49 SEC 
Docket 1373, 1991 WL 296668 (Sept. 24, 1991) (announcing settlement of Rule 10b-5 
action against general partner and securities analyst at Cowen & Co., who allegedly 
sold his entire personal holding of nearly 11,000 shares of stock in an issuer after its 
CEO selectively disclosed negative material nonpublic information). The Rosenberg 
release states that the respondent “did not communicate the information that he learned” 
from the issuer’s CEO to Cowen & Co. or its clients prior to the issuer’s public 
announcement, and that Rosenberg’s personal gain from his stock sales breached “a 
duty arising out of a relationship of trust and confidence that he had with Cowen and 
Cowen’s clients.” Id. at *1. To be sure, nothing reported in the media suggests that the 
SEC is investigating personal securities transactions in connection with the Paulson 
meeting. But in any event, when material nonpublic government information is at issue, 
the SEC might well refrain from charging employees with a Rule 10b-5 violation 
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As the financial crisis dragged on, hedge funds and professional 
investors were also reported to be bullish on tips from the Federal 
Reserve (“the Fed”).88 Although the Fed has specific rules that prohibit 
officials from disclosing confidential Fed actions that have not yet been 
made public, well-connected analysts and investors can often “glean[] 
clues about the thinking of Fed officials during private talks.”89 For 
example, in the course of an August 15, 2011 meeting with Chairman 
Ben Bernanke in his office, one consultant apparently deduced that the 
Fed would be pushing down long-term interest rates by selling 
medium-term bonds and using the proceeds to buy long-term bonds (a 
1960s-era strategy known as “Operation Twist”).90 Selective disclosures 
may have been made to other consultants as well because there were 
sharp increases in the prices for long-term bonds in the five-week 
period before the official public announcement of Operation Twist on 
September 21.91 The stark contrast between Regulation FD’s 
prohibition of selective disclosure in the private sector and the lax 
standards applicable to the public sector prompted one securities law 
scholar to post on his blog: “[I]f private issuers shouldn’t be giving 
select investors an informational advantage, shouldn’t the same 
principle apply to the government?”92 Since then, however, both the 
Fed and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York have taken steps to 
increase transparency and reduce the likelihood of selective 
disclosure.93  
The Department of Defense (DOD) is yet another outlet for those 
seeking to mine political intelligence. To be sure, much information 
from the DOD is expressly classified as confidential and a federal 
official’s disclosure of such information to outsiders can often be 
prosecuted as a crime.94 But privileged investors may sometimes gain 
 
premised on the counterintuitive notion that an investment bank or hedge fund has an 
exclusive right to the use of a federal official’s selective disclosure.  
 88. Susan Pulliam, Investors Bullish on Fed Tips, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 
2011, at A1.  
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. (reporting that after her meeting with Chairman Ben Bernanke, Nancy 
Lazar, an economist with International Strategies & Investment Group, Inc., “made a 
hasty call to investor clients”).  
 91. Id. 
 92. See Bainbridge, supra note 47. 
 93. See infra notes 393–396 and accompanying text (discussing the Fed’s 
recent decision to publicly disclose federal funds rate forecasts for its policy committee 
members and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s recent decision to post on its 
website the surveys it sends to major financial firms ahead of monetary-policy 
meetings). 
 94. See Scott Shane, Inquiry of Leaks Is Casting Chill over Coverage, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 2, 2012, at A1 (discussing “the most sweeping” criminal investigation in 
2012:1285 Selective Disclosure by Federal Officials 1305 
access to other types of nonpublic information that could affect the 
stock price of publicly traded companies, such as Lockheed-Martin, 
Boeing, Northrop-Grumman, or other military contractors of a smaller 
size. A New York Times columnist, for instance, has sharply critiqued 
what he claimed was the growing practice of officials at the Pentagon 
“sidling up to” institutional investors and securities analysts 
specializing in the military industry.95 He recounted, in particular, a 
private meeting between the DOD’s Deputy Secretary and a dozen or 
so Wall Street analysts in October 2010, which “lay[ed] out the 
Pentagon’s cost-cutting plans in astonishing detail,”96 and a breakfast 
speech delivered by the DOD’s Undersecretary for Acquisitions at a 
military industry investment conference in February 2011 with T. Rowe 
Price and other large institutional investors in attendance.97 The 
episodes prompted the columnist to ask: “If you were an investor in the 
military industry, would you find this useful information? You bet—this 
is the stuff that can move markets.”98 The DOD insists that “nothing 
new was divulged during the [analyst] session” in October 2010,99 and 
the text of the February 2011 breakfast speech can be found on a DOD 
website.100 But unless the information that was discussed with the 
analysts or shared in the breakfast speech had already been disclosed 
 
years into intelligence disclosures made to the media, “which has reached into the 
White House, the Pentagon, the National Security Agency and the C.I.A.”); infra note 
411 (citing the Supreme Court’s decision in N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 
713 (1971) (the Pentagon Papers case)). 
 95. Joe Nocera, From Pentagon, A Buy Rating on Contractors, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 12, 2011, at B1. 
 96. Id.  
 97. Id. According to Nocera, the attendees at the conference were told that 
“the Pentagon would frown on mergers among the five giant military contractors [but] 
. . . was going to encourage mergers among smaller military contractors. And, . . . ‘[it 
would] be attentive’ to innovative smaller companies that provide services (as opposed 
to weapons systems) to the Pentagon.” Id. 
 98. Id.  
 99. Id. As Nocera observes, Reuters “uncovered the meeting” and reported on 
it a few days after it occurred. Id. According to that Reuters report, the analysts at 
“Friday’s closed-door meeting in New York” were “sworn to secrecy, but sources 
familiar with the proceeding said [the Deputy Defense Secretary] faced tough questions 
about future profit margins and the Pentagon’s ability to maintain a choice of suppliers 
given decreased demand for weapons.” Andrea Shalal-Esa, Pentagon Pitches Austerity 
Plan to Nervous Wall St., REUTERS NEWS (Oct. 5, 2010, 3:24 AM), 
http://in.reuters.com/article/2010/10/05/arms-wallstreet-idINN0521646520101005. 
 100. See Ashton B. Carter, Undersecretary of Def. for Acquisition, Tech., and 
Logistics, Remarks at Cowen Investment Conference: The Defense Industry Enters a 
New Era (Feb. 9, 2011), available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/docs/ 
USD_AT&L__Cowen_Speech_020911.pdf. 
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“to achieve a broad dissemination to the investing public generally,”101 
the DOD may well have accorded the analysts and institutional 
investors an investment edge.102  
Even agencies such as the DOE and CMS can be focal points for 
valuable political intelligence when their regulatory initiatives affect 
publicly traded companies. Last summer, prompted by concerns that 
DOE officials may have selectively disclosed nonpublic market-moving 
information that was used for securities trading, Senator Charles 
Grassley (R-Iowa) began an investigation into possible leaks.103 Among 
other matters, the senator questioned whether a well-known hedge fund 
manager, who had been shorting stock in for-profit colleges, may have 
received nonpublic information from DOE officials pertaining to the 
imposition of new regulations—a so-called gainful employment rule 
aimed at for-profit colleges.104 The senator set out eight questions in a 
letter to DOE Secretary Arne Duncan, including one that inquired: 
“[W]hat internal controls does the Department have to ensure that 
non-public information is not leaked to [investors in for-profit 
institutions] and that these investors do not influence the Department’s 
policies?”105 As Senator Grassley’s letter reflects, the hedge fund 
manager may have been lobbying the DOE for a regulatory crackdown 
on for-profit colleges at the same time as he was shorting their stock, 
which would raise concerns about other possible market abuses.106 Less 
 
 101. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (quoting the SEC’s test for when 
information can be deemed to be in the public realm). 
 102. Cf. infra notes 339–344 and accompanying text (discussing SEC guidance 
in Regulation FD’s adopting release as to how issuers can make “public disclosures” 
and subsequent SEC guidance as to whether postings on corporate websites can be 
deemed publicly disseminated for purposes of Regulation FD). 
 103. Ben Protess, Grassley Questions Education Agency’s Ties to Hedge 
Funds, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (July 28, 2011, 10:02 AM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/07/28/grassley-questions-education-agencys-ties-to-
wall-street/. 
 104. Letter from Sen. Charles Grassley to Arne Duncan, DOE Secretary (July 
26, 2011) [hereinafter Grassley DOE Letter], available at 
http://www.grassley.senate.gov/about/upload/DuncanLetter.pdf. Senator Grassley’s 
letter quotes an e-mail from hedge fund manager Steve Eisman to DOE officials that 
was obtained by FOIA requests filed by public interest groups. Id. 
 105. Id.  
 106. Id. The nonprofit legal watchdog group, Citizens for Responsibility and 
Ethics in Washington (CREW), sent letters to the SEC and the DOJ raising questions 
about the fairness of DOE’s regulatory process as well as investors’ efforts to influence 
DOE regulations for their own personal gain. See Press Release, Citizens for 
Responsibility & Ethics in Washington, CREW Provides SEC New Information about 
Short-Sellers’ Efforts to Shape Education Regulations (Mar. 1, 2011), available at 
http://www.citizensforethics.org/press/entry/crew-provides-sec-new-info-short-sellers-
shaping-education-regulation. 
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than six months later, in December 2011, Senator Grassley launched a 
second inquiry into possible incidents of selective disclosure, this time 
at the CMS.107 In a letter to the CMS’s Acting Administrator requesting 
responses to nineteen questions, the senator revealed that “[a] 
whistleblower within CMS has alleged that high level CMS employees 
attended lengthy information gathering briefings at the request of hedge 
funds and political intelligence brokers with no discernible benefit to 
CMS or the Federal government.”108 He was frank in expressing his 
concern about “a continuing pattern in which CMS officials . . . under 
the cover of reaching out and meeting with stakeholders, have 
disseminated information to well-connected lobbyists in non-public 
settings.”109 
Also in 2011, the U.S. credit rating—established by Alexander 
Hamilton more than 220 years ago110—was placed at risk, and much 
material nonpublic information had been swirling around Washington as 
to whether and when the government would resolve the debt-ceiling 
crisis.111 Although the media fueled speculation about possible 
repercussions from the ballooning national debt, specific details about a 
credit rating downgrade were not made public until August 5, 2011, 
when S&P announced its decision to reduce the federal government’s 
rating from AAA to AA+.112 The abnormally high volume of securities 
trading that preceded the announcement prompted an SEC investigation 
into whether officials—perhaps at S&P, but conceivably at the Treasury 
Department—may have selectively disclosed advance information about 
the downgrade.113  
A final example of media-profiled selective disclosure returns full 
circle to Congress. In December 2011, in the wake of congressional 
hearings on the STOCK Act, the Wall Street Journal featured a front 
page report on the “network of brokers, lobbyists and political insiders 
who arrange private meetings” between hedge fund managers and 
 
 107. Letter from Sen. Charles Grassley to Marilyn Tavenner, CMS Acting 
Adm’r (Dec. 12, 2011) [hereinafter Grassley CMS Letter], available at 
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/GrassleyCMSLetter_Dec2011.pdf. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See supra text accompanying notes 48–49. 
 111. See Mullins & Pulliam, supra note 20 (reporting that political intelligence 
consultants arranged Capitol Hill meetings on topics including “whether political 
deadlock debate would lead to a U.S. default”).  
 112. See Jean Eaglesham, U.S. Probes Rating-Cut Trades; Regulators 
Subpoena Hedge Funds, Others over Actions ahead of S&P Downgrade, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 20, 2011, at A1; Kim Peterson, Who Leaked the S&P Downgrade News?, MSN 
MONEY (Aug. 12, 2011, 2:27 PM), http://money.msn.com/exchange-traded-
fund/article.aspx?post=77dc9185-ed4f-4b98-bdba-6b818b601f86. 
 113. See Eaglesham, supra note 112; Peterson, supra note 112. 
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members of Congress or their legislative aides.114 The article depicted 
the hedge fund managers as “a select group who pay[s] for early, 
firsthand reports on Capitol Hill” and contended that “[s]eeking 
advance word of government decisions is part of a growing, lucrative—
and legal—practice.”115 A number of specific incidents were recounted, 
including briefings arranged by the Wall Street firm of JNK Securities 
that occurred on December 8, 2009.116 The briefings took place in the 
Capitol Building, hours before the public announcement of the brokered 
compromise that eliminated the proposed government insurance option 
in the Senate bill that later became the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (often referred to as “Obamacare”).117 The Wall 
Street Journal acknowledged that none of the hedge funds who “were 
let in on the deal” would “publicly divulge how they used the 
information.”118 But it speculated that the “news was potentially worth 
millions of dollars” to the attendees at the briefings because the deal 
helped boost the share price of Aetna, Cigna, and other large national 
insurers that would have faced competition from a government-run 
insurance plan.119 It further reported that JNK Securities had organized 
“more than 200 similar sessions over the past three years” on a wide 
range of other topics.120 The legislators who were interviewed defended 
the JNK sessions and other briefings and meetings as a means of 
gathering valuable feedback and analysis from the investment 
community.121 
 
 114. Mullins & Pulliam, supra note 20.  
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. (describing JNK Securities as “one of the most aggressive of the 
dozens of companies that escort clients around Capitol Hill”).  
 117. Id.  
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. (stating that meeting topics ranged from “how Congress would weigh 
in on the proposed merger between Express Scripts Inc. and Medco Health Solutions 
Inc.” to “whether political deadlock [during the debt-ceiling debate] would lead to a 
U.S. default”). Although hedge funds no longer pay fees to JNK Securities for 
arranging the meetings, “[i]f they use information gleaned at these face-to-face 
meetings they are expected to execute trades through the brokerage firm, which collects 
commissions.” Id.  
 121. Id. (“Republicans say they seek the view of hedge fund managers to help 
shape laws that spur investment. Democrats say the conversations lead to better public 
policy because investors tell them about loopholes, inefficiencies or unseen 
consequences of existing laws.”).  
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B. Fraudulent Tipping vs. Unfair Selective Disclosure  
Notwithstanding the potentially valuable feedback and insights that 
can stem from meetings with political intelligence consultants, hedge 
fund managers, and other professional investors, the selective 
disclosure of market-moving government information places ordinary 
investors at a significant disadvantage in the securities markets. But as 
this Section will explain, most selective disclosures—including virtually 
all of the examples discussed in the prior Section—are unlikely to 
constitute fraudulent tipping under the federal securities laws. 
Moreover, because liability for fraudulent trading on tips is derivative, 
the privileged recipients of selectively disclosed government 
information are generally free to use it to trade securities. Although the 
recently enacted STOCK Act makes explicit that Section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 apply to members of Congress and all other federal officials and 
employees, the Act does nothing to alter controlling judicial 
interpretations as to what constitutes fraud under these provisions. 
Thus, to distinguish between fraudulent tipping on the one hand and 
unfair selective disclosure on the other, we must turn to the case law.  
1. PROSECUTIONS INVOLVING TIPS BY FEDERAL OFFICIALS 
We have no doubt that the vast majority of federal officials who 
have shared material nonpublic information with securities investors did 
so for reasons consistent with their duties of trust and confidence to the 
federal government and its citizens. Yet, history reveals some rogue 
government officials who divulged market-moving information to 
outsiders for purposes that were undisputably disloyal. In the particular 
instances recounted below, the federal officials who tipped and/or their 
accomplices who traded were prosecuted for conduct that today would 
violate Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 (or the Commodity Exchange Act, 
when the trading involves commodities).122 Even before these laws were 
 
 122. Unlike the federal securities laws, under which insider trading is 
prosecuted as a species of fraud, the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) expressly 
prohibits certain types of insider trading in commodities markets. In 2010, Congress 
amended Section 6c(a) of the CEA to explicitly ban commodities insider trading (and 
tipping) based on nonpublic information misappropriated from a government source. 7 
U.S.C.S. § 6c(a) (LexisNexis 2010). This was done in response to a specific request by 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). See Hearing to Review 
Implementation of Changes to the Commodity Exchange Act Contained in the 2008 
Farm Bill: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Gen. Farm Commodities & Risk Mgmt. 
of the H. Comm. on Agric., 111th Cong. 2–6 (2010) (statement of Gary Gensler, 
CFTC Chairman). The new CEA provision has been described as the “Eddie Murphy” 
rule, an allusion to the actor’s starring role in Trading Places, a movie involving 
scheming brothers who are seeking to profit from trades in frozen concentrated orange 
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in place, however, federal officials who enabled outsiders to profit in 
financial markets could be prosecuted under criminal statutes 
proscribing fraudulent conspiracies against the United States.  
The Second Circuit’s relatively recent decision in United States v. 
Royer123 describes one highly publicized prosecution for illegal tipping 
and trading under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Jeffrey Royer, a 
former FBI agent, had been convicted and sentenced to six years in 
prison for leaking confidential FBI information to Tony Elgindy.124 
Elgindy, who was also convicted and sentenced to prison, used the 
FBI’s information to short the stock of publicly traded companies under 
investigation, effectively betting on a market price decline.125 In 
denying their appeal, the Second Circuit pointed to the jury’s finding 
that “the defendants unlawfully traded in various securities on the basis 
of material confidential information that Royer had misappropriated and 
then shared with Elgindy for the purpose of securities trading.”126 As an 
employee of the FBI, Royer stood in a relationship of trust and 
confidence with the agency and he breached this duty of loyalty when 
he disclosed its confidential data expecting to receive a share of the 
trading profits as well as a lucrative private sector job “making a 
million dollars a year” with Elgindy.127 
In 1905—nearly a century before Royer and three decades before 
Congress sought to regulate the financial markets—a tipping and trading 
scandal occurred at the USDA. The prosecution eventually reached the 
Supreme Court in Haas v. Henkel,128 where the Justices reviewed an 
indictment charging the defendants with a conspiracy to obtain crop 
reports from a USDA statistician “in advance of general publicity and 
to use such information in speculating upon the cotton market.”129 The 
Court concluded that the conspiracy, if proven, would have defrauded 
“the United States by defeating, obstructing and impairing it in the 
exercise of its governmental function in the regular and official duty of 
 
juice futures contracts using an illicitly obtained USDA orange crop report. Id. at 7; see 
also infra notes 128–133 and accompanying text (discussing the real life 1905 tipping 
scandal involving a misappropriated USDA cotton crop report). As part of the STOCK 
Act, Congress amended the CEA to make explicitly clear that Section 4(c)(a) extends to 
members of Congress and congressional employees, as well as to judicial officers and 
judicial employees, both with respect to tipping and trading. See STOCK Act, Pub. L. 
No. 112-105, § 5, 126 Stat. 291, 293 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a) (2012)). 
 123. 549 F.3d 886 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 124. Id. at 890–91. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 897. 
 127. Brief for the United States at 150, United States v. Royer, 549 F.3d 886 
(2d Cir. 2008) (No. 06-4081-CR), 2007 WL 6506774. 
 128. 216 U.S. 462 (1910). 
 129. Id. at 478. 
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publicly promulgating fair, impartial and accurate reports concerning 
the cotton crop.”130 A USDA investigation of the scandal later revealed 
that a bureau chief had suspected that something was amiss, and had 
decreed that the statistician and two other employees were not to leave 
their work areas until the cotton report had been publicly 
disseminated.131 But the sly statistician and his commodities trading 
partner were hardly deterred. The investigation uncovered that they had 
“worked out a signal system using a particular window blind to indicate 
the level of the figure to be published.”132 The USDA statistician was 
ultimately sentenced to a fine of $5000.133  
At least four other federal government insiders have been charged 
with unlawfully communicating material nonpublic government 
information to outsiders who traded securities based on that 
information. These include: a former FDA chemist and his son, who in 
2011 were charged with trading stocks of drug companies based on 
unreleased drug approval determinations (though prosecutors 
subsequently dismissed the securities fraud charges involving the 
son);134 a former director of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, who 
in 1989 admitted that he had regularly disclosed nonpublic information 
about the Fed’s discount rate to a securities brokerage firm;135 a former 
 
 130. Id.  
 131. See ALLEN, supra note 61, at 1–2.  
 132. Id. at 2. The statistician, E.F. Holmes, and his trading partner “apparently 
estimated a probable level for the national figure and if the actual total was close to 
their estimate Holmes raised the window blind to the middle of the window. If the total 
was higher or lower, Holmes adjusted the blind based on the scale they had contrived.” 
Id.  
 133. Id.  
 134. See Cheng Yi Liang, Litigation Release No. 22,171 (Nov. 30, 2011), 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2011/lr22171.htm (announcing that a former 
FDA chemist consented to the entry of an injunction and agreed to pay disgorgement of 
$3,776,152, which was deemed satisfied by the forfeiture order entered as part of his 
guilty plea in the parallel criminal case); David S. Hilzenrath, Former FDA Chemist 
Sentenced to 5 Years for Insider Trading, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2012, at A13 
(reporting that the chemist’s son “was arrested on accusations of securities fraud, his 
computer was seized, and he was later sentenced to just over a year in prison for 
possession of child pornography”). 
 135. Joseph F. Sullivan, A Former Official of Federal Bank Indicted as Insider, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1988, at A1 (reporting allegations by then-United States Attorney 
Samuel Alito that Robert Rough’s tips “enabled the securities firm to ‘fraudulently 
make millions in profits and avoid millions of dollars in trading losses’” and that, in 
return, “the company gave Mr. Rough $47,000 in interest-deferred loans, which were 
repaid”); Shift by U.S. in Insider Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1989, at D12 (reporting 
that in exchange for Rough’s plea to one count of bank fraud, “[t]he Government 
agreed to drop six other counts, including insider trading, and . . . agreed to 
recommend a prison term of less than a year”); Fed Ex-Official Gets 6 Months, N.Y. 
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branch chief of the SEC’s corporation finance division, who in 1966 
communicated nonpublic information about a confidential investigation 
to a securities trader who had “procur[ed] female company” for the 
SEC staffer’s benefit;136 and a former law clerk to Supreme Court 
Justice Joseph McKenna, who was the subject of a dismissed 
prosecution in 1919 for allegedly tipping others who traded securities 
based on information pertaining to an unreleased Court decision.137  
Although the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. 
O’Hagan did not address directly the question of tipping, its 
misappropriation theory provides a clear roadmap for what prosecutors 
must now prove to establish Rule 10b-5 liability in cases against federal 
officials for illegally tipping. Under O’Hagan, “a person commits fraud 
‘in connection with’ a securities transaction, and thereby violates 
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, when he misappropriates confidential 
information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to 
 
TIMES, Sept. 14, 1989, at D7 (reporting Rough’s sentence of six months in prison and 
200 hours of community service during two years of probation). 
 The Rough incident was not the only tipping scandal to beset the Federal Reserve. 
Over a three-year-period from 1964 through 1967, a manager of the Bond and Custody 
Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia allegedly disclosed 
confidential Treasury Department information about upcoming issuances of government 
securities to bond dealers at Blyth & Company Inc., who traded securities on the basis 
of that material nonpublic information. See Blyth & Co., 43 S.E.C. 1037 (Jan. 17, 
1969). The SEC initiated and settled a Rule 10b-5 enforcement action against the 
brokerage firm and the bond traders based on their failure to abstain from trading while 
in possession of material information that they knew “was intended to be kept 
non-public until a predetermined time and then disseminated pursuant to established 
official procedures.” Id. at 1039–40. The SEC Release, however, did not name the 
manager, but it did observe that he was suspended immediately after his tipping conduct 
came to light and that he died just over a week later. Id. at 1039 n.3. 
 136. United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 49–51 (2d Cir. 1970) (affirming 
Philip Peltz’s conviction for “conspir[ing] with others, including an employee of the 
SEC, to obtain confidential inside information about matters under consideration by the 
Commission and use such information for private profit”). The Second Circuit observed 
that Peltz had defended prostitutes in his legal practice and quotes witness testimony 
revealing that Peltz sometimes “would get the company of these girls for his friends in 
Washington.” Id. at 50. The SEC staffer was indicted for and convicted of perjury on 
the basis of his grand jury testimony. See United States v. Weiner, 479 F.2d 923, 924 
(2d Cir. 1973). 
 137. See John B. Owens, The Clerk, the Thief, His Life as a Baker: Ashton 
Embry and the Supreme Court Leak Scandal of 1919, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 271, 272 
(2000). As Owens explains it, the case was dismissed even though an indictment against 
the law clerk had been upheld by the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia and 
a writ of certiorari had been denied by the Supreme Court. See id. at 295–97 (citing 
Embry v. United States, 257 U.S. 655 (1921)). Owens maintains that the DOJ’s 
“official files remain eerily quiet on the subject, containing no notes or memoranda 
explaining why the U.S. Attorney dismissed the case.” Id. at 297. 
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the source of the information.”138 And under the STOCK Act, all 
federal officials owe “a duty arising from a relationship of trust and 
confidence” to the U.S. Government and its citizens “with respect to 
material, nonpublic information derived from such person’s 
position . . . or gained from the performance of such person’s official 
responsibilities.”139 Thus, in a prosecution against a federal official for 
illegal tipping, Section 10(b)’s deception element would be satisfied by 
proof of the official’s “undisclosed, self-serving use of [the 
government’s] information”140 and Section 10(b)’s “in connection with” 
element would be satisfied by proof that the federal official knew or 
was reckless in not knowing that the information was to be used for 
securities trading purposes.141 Section 10(b) also requires prosecutors to 
prove that the information was both material and nonpublic,142 and that 
the federal official acted with scienter, “a mental state embracing intent 
to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”143 As the SEC Enforcement 
Director recently assured congressional officials in his testimony on the 
STOCK Act: “You have to be acting with corrupt intent, knowledge, or 
recklessness. If you act in good faith, you are not going to be guilty.”144 
O’Hagan’s misappropriation theory extends as well to certain 
tippees who trade securities on the basis of material nonpublic 
 
 138. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997) (internal citation 
omitted). 
 139. STOCK Act, Pub. L. No. 112-105, §§ 4(b), 9(b), 126 Stat. 291, 292, 
297–98 (2012) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(g) to (h) (2012)). The STOCK Act 
also specifies that members of Congress and congressional employees owe a duty to 
Congress itself. § 4(b).  
 140. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652. 
 141. Id.; see also United States v. Gansman, 657 F.3d 85, 92 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(“In prosecuting a putative ‘tipper’ under the misappropriation theory of insider 
trading, the government must prove as an element of the offense that the tipper 
conveyed material nonpublic information to his ‘tippee’ with the understanding that it 
would be used for securities trading purposes.”). Nearly twenty years before Gansman, 
the Second Circuit held that Rule 10b-5 liability could be established even in the 
absence of proof that the defendant tippers knew their breach of fiduciary duty would 
lead to securities trading. See United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 602 (2d Cir. 
1993). But the intervening ruling in O’Hagan likely prompted a re-evaluation of Libera. 
See Donna M. Nagy, Reframing the Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading 
Liability: A Post-O’Hagan Suggestion, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1223, 1263 n.199 (1998) (“If 
the tippers [in Libera] did not have any knowledge that the information conveyed would 
be used by the tippees for securities trading purposes, it is difficult to see how the 
tippers’ breach of duty (in which the tippees were co-participants) can satisfy even the 
broadest interpretation of Section 10(b)’s ‘in connection with’ nexus.”). 
 142. See supra notes 81–82. Part II.B’s discussion of Regulation FD further 
elaborates on the question of when information is material and nonpublic. 
 143. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12 (1976). 
 144. See House STOCK Act Hearing, supra note 22, at 32 (statement of Robert 
Khuzami, Director, SEC Division of Enforcement). 
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government information. As then-Second Circuit Judge Sonia 
Sotomayor recognized in United States v. Falcone,145 to make a case 
against a tippee defendant, the SEC or DOJ is “simply required to 
prove a breach by . . . the tipper, of a duty owed to the owner of the 
misappropriated information, and defendant’s knowledge that the tipper 
had breached the duty.”146 These prerequisites to tippee liability were 
present in the Royer case, where the short seller Elgindy was convicted 
and sentenced to prison for trading on tips conveyed to him by Royer, 
then an agent for the FBI.147 In essence, Royer defrauded the federal 
government and its citizens through his secret, self-serving use of the 
FBI’s information for personal gain and Elgindy was a co-participant in 
that fraud.  
2. SELF-SERVING USE OF INFORMATION BY TIPPING RATHER THAN 
TRADING  
O’Hagan’s misappropriation theory constitutes one of the two 
theories under which insider trading violates Section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5. The Court’s alternative theory, the “traditional” or “classical 
theory,” holds that a violation occurs when a corporate insider, such as 
an officer, director, or employee “trades in the securities of his 
corporation on the basis of material, non-public information.”148 As the 
Court recognized in Chiarella v. United States,149 such classical insider 
trading violates Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because “a relationship of 
trust and confidence [exists] between the shareholders of a corporation 
and those insiders who have obtained confidential information by 
reason of their position with that corporation,” and this relationship 
gives rise to a duty to disclose or abstain from trading.150 The Chiarella 
decision was groundbreaking because it rejected the parity-of-
information approach that had been developed by the SEC and lower 
courts, which required “anyone in possession of material inside 
information [to] either disclose it to the investing public, or . . . abstain 
 
 145. 257 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 146. Id. at 234.  
 147. See supra notes 123–127 and accompanying text.  
 148. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651–52 (1997). 
 149. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).  
 150. Id. at 228. Three years later in Dirks, the Court observed that this 
classical theory also extended to temporary agents or “constructive insiders” of the 
securities issuer, such as lawyers, accountants, or consultants, who “become 
fiduciaries” of the corporation’s shareholders because “they have entered into a special 
confidential relationship in the conduct of the business of the enterprise and are given 
access to information solely for corporate purposes.” Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 
n.14 (1983). 
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from trading in or recommending the securities concerned while such 
inside information remains undisclosed.”151 In the Court’s view, this 
broad parity-of-information approach flouted a fundamental precept of 
common law fraud: that silence about material facts in a business 
transaction amounted to fraud only in the context of a fiduciary-like 
relationship of trust and confidence between the parties.152  
As the Court explained in O’Hagan, the classical theory and the 
misappropriation theory are complementary because “each address[es] 
efforts to capitalize on nonpublic information” in connection with 
securities trading, while adhering to the common law’s requirement of 
a disclosure duty arising from a relationship of trust and confidence.153 
Whereas the “classical theory targets a corporate insider’s breach of 
duty to shareholders with whom the insider transacts, the 
misappropriation theory outlaws trading on the basis of nonpublic 
information by a corporate ‘outsider’ in breach of a duty owed not to a 
trading party, but to the source of the information.”154 
Government insider trading cases fall squarely within the 
misappropriation theory. Although federal officials are “insiders” of the 
U.S. government, they are “outsiders” to the corporate issuer whose 
securities are traded. But the classical theory—as reaffirmed and 
expanded in Dirks v. SEC—is essential to understanding the 
misappropriation theory’s application to tipping. That is, Dirks 
illuminates how federal officials can be said to deceive and defraud the 
federal government and its citizens by self-servingly communicating 
information to others who trade securities.155 
Although Dirks was quick to echo Chiarella’s view that Rule 10b-5 
liability turned on the “specific relationship between the shareholders 
and the individual trading on inside information,”156 Dirks extended the 
duty to disclose or abstain beyond corporate insiders to certain tippees 
whose liability would be “derivative from that of the insider’s duty.”157 
As Justice Lewis Powell’s majority opinion explained, although a tippee 
of a corporate insider typically stands as a stranger to an issuer’s 
 
 151. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 152. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228 (“[O]ne who fails to disclose material 
information prior to the consummation of a transaction commits fraud only when he is 
under a duty to do so.”). 
 153. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652.  
 154. Id. at 652–53.  
 155. See SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2012); SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 
1263, 1270 n.15 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 156. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 (1983). 
 157. Id. at 659 (explaining that “tippee’s obligation has been viewed as arising 
from his role as a participant after the fact in the insider’s breach of a fiduciary duty” 
(citing Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230 n.12)). 
1316 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
shareholders, a tippee would nonetheless assume a fiduciary-like duty 
not to trade on material nonpublic information “when the insider has 
breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the 
information to the tippee and the tippee knows or should know that 
there has been a breach.”158  
Justice Powell, however, was explicit in holding that not all 
disclosures of material nonpublic information would violate an insider’s 
fiduciary duty. Instead, because “a purpose of the securities laws was 
to eliminate ‘use of inside information for personal advantage,’”159 he 
held that Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liability turned on the insider’s 
motivation for disclosing the information.160 The requisite inquiry is 
therefore a contextual one that focuses on “objective criteria, i.e., 
whether the insider receives a direct or indirect personal benefit from 
the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that 
will translate into future earnings.”161 That statement was immediately 
followed by a quote from a law review article authored years before by 
Professor Victor Brudney: “The theory . . . is that the insider, by 
giving the information out selectively, is in effect selling the 
information to its recipient for cash, reciprocal information, or other 
things of value for himself . . . .”162 
Elaborating on the particular facts and circumstances that could 
support the requisite finding of unjust enrichment (and thus disloyalty) 
on the part of an insider, Justice Powell stated:  
For example, there may be a relationship between the insider 
and the recipient that suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, 
or an intention to benefit the particular recipient. The 
elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic 
information also exist when an insider makes a gift of 
confidential information to a trading relative or friend. The tip 
and trade resemble trading by the insider himself followed by 
a gift of the profits to the recipient.163 
Justice Powell acknowledged that such determinations of fact “will 
not always be easy for courts.”164 But he concluded that this personal 
benefit test was nonetheless “essential . . . to have a guiding principle 
 
 158. Id. at 660. 
 159. Id. at 662 (quoting In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 n.15 
(1961)). 
 160. Id. at 662. 
 161. Id. at 663 (emphasis added).  
 162. Id. at 664 (quoting Brudney, supra note 3, at 348). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id.  
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for those whose daily activities must be limited and instructed by the 
SEC’s insider-trading rules.”165  
As other securities law scholars have emphasized, Dirks’ guiding 
principle recognizes that what Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 proscribe 
“is not merely a breach of confidentiality by the insider, but rather a 
breach of the duty of loyalty imposed on all fiduciaries to avoid 
personally profiting from information entrusted to them.”166 Dirks’ 
guiding principle is likewise outcome determinative for the recipients of 
material nonpublic information as well: “Absent some personal gain, 
there has been no breach of duty . . . . And absent a breach by the 
insider, there is no derivative breach.”167  
Although a few courts have questioned whether the classical 
theory’s tipper-personal benefit requirement applies to cases predicated 
on the misappropriation theory,168 the Eleventh Circuit drew no such 
distinction in SEC v. Yun.169 After extensive analysis, Yun read 
O’Hagan to require a tipper’s personal gain as a necessary element for 
tipper/tippee liability in misappropriation cases.170 The Second Circuit 
likewise applied the personal benefit test in SEC v. Obus,171 a recent 
 
 165. Id.  
 166. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties into the 
Federal Insider Trading Prohibition, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189, 1195 (1995); see 
also A.C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the Counterrevolution in the 
Federal Securities Laws, 52 DUKE L.J. 841, 942 (2003) (stating that under Powell’s 
reasoning, “[g]arden variety breaches of the duty of care were clearly out; tipping 
required a breach of the duty of loyalty”). 
 167. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662. Despite Dirks’ clear dictate that a tippee’s 
liability under Rule 10b-5 derives entirely from a tipper’s misuse of information for 
personal gain, in United States v. Evans, 486 F.3d 315 (7th Cir. 2007), the court 
affirmed the criminal conviction of a tippee who was retried after the friend who 
allegedly tipped him had been acquitted in the previous trial, id. at 325. It is 
exceedingly difficult to square this result with Dirks, and the court’s effort to do so was 
not convincing. See Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of 
Fiduciary Principles, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1315, 1347–48 (2009).  
 168. See, e.g., SEC v. Rocklage, 470 F.3d 1, 7 n.4 (1st Cir. 2006) (observing 
that the First Circuit has “left open” the question of personal benefit in 
misappropriation cases, but finding that the tipper’s “gift of information” to her brother 
satisfied that the Dirks test, in any event); SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68, 77 (1st Cir. 
2000) (addressing the SEC’s argument and citing pre-O’Hagan cases for the view that 
there is no personal benefit requirement in misappropriation theory cases, but then 
finding that the Dirks test was satisfied because the tipper likely disclosed the 
information “to effect a reconciliation with his friend and to maintain a useful 
networking contact”). For a comment arguing against a personal benefit requirement in 
misappropriation theory cases, see David T. Cohen, Comment, Old Rule, New Theory: 
Revising the Personal Benefit Requirement for Tipper/Tippee Liability under the 
Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading, 47 B.C. L. REV. 547 (2006). 
 169. 327 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2003).  
 170. Id. at 1279–80. 
 171. 693 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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decision stating explicitly that the tipping doctrine developed in Dirks 
also “governs in a misappropriation case.”172 Indeed, since O’Hagan 
was decided, no court has ever extended misappropriation theory 
liability to a putative tipper in the absence of evidence that he or she 
conveyed the material nonpublic information in exchange for a direct or 
indirect personal benefit.  
The Eleventh Circuit’s analysis in Yun goes to the heart of the 
personal benefit issue. The facts involved the wife of a corporate 
executive who had been held liable under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
for misappropriating material nonpublic information from her husband, 
who was the president of a Scholastic Corporation subsidiary.173 The 
wife, however, did not trade securities herself. Rather, a jury found 
that she and a co-worker/friend had defrauded her husband when she 
secretly conveyed negative earnings information, with which she had 
been entrusted, to the co-worker/friend, who then used that information 
to trade put options on the husband’s company.174 Although the SEC 
maintained that its evidence showed that the wife had personally 
benefitted from her disclosure, the SEC also argued that it did not have 
to prove that she “divulged the information for her own benefit; all it 
had to show was that [the wife] acted with ‘severe recklessness.’”175 
The Yun court emphatically rejected the SEC’s argument that “severe 
recklessness,” in the absence of a showing of a personal benefit to the 
tipper, is sufficient to sustain misappropriation theory liability.176  
The SEC conceded that O’Hagan’s misappropriation theory rests 
on an agent’s secret misuse of a principal’s information.177 But it argued 
in its litigation brief that “personal benefit” to the agent (in this case, 
the executive’s wife) was merely one of two alternate vehicles for 
establishing the misappropriation theory’s requisite misuse.178 
 
 172. Id. at 285–86. The court vacated the summary judgment order for 
defendants and ruled that the SEC had presented sufficient evidence that “if the tip 
occurred,” the alleged misappropriator “made the tip intentionally and received a 
personal benefit from it.” Id. at 291. 
 173. Yun, 327 F.3d at 1274. 
 174. Id. at 1267–70. 
 175. Id. at 1274. The Yun court observed that the SEC’s argument on appeal 
was “contrary to the position it assumed in its complaint,” which had plainly alleged 
that the wife had “deliberately communicated the confidential information [to her 
friend] ‘for her direct and/or indirect personal benefit because of her business 
relationship and friendship with’” him. Id. (quoting Complaint and Demand for Jury 
Trial Injunctive Relief Sought, SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2003) (No. 
699CV00117), 1999 WL 34965842 at ¶ 21). 
 176. Id. at 1282. 
 177. See Brief of Securities and Exchange Commission, Appellee, SEC v. 
Yun, 327 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2003) (No. 01-14490), 2001 WL 34455703, at *42–43. 
 178. Id. at *45. 
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According to the SEC, the other way by which an agent could breach 
her duty not to misuse information “is by making an unauthorized 
disclosure of confidential information in a way that is likely to harm the 
principal.”179 The SEC drew support from section 395 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency, which was cited by the Court in 
O’Hagan.180 The SEC thus sought to convince the court that regardless 
of whether the wife personally gained from her disclosure of the 
entrusted information, the wife had recklessly harmed her husband’s 
reputation and career, thereby warranting both tipper and tippee 
liability.181  
The SEC’s “harm to the principal” argument, however, 
overlooked several key statements in O’Hagan, all of which make clear 
that the misappropriation theory always requires undisclosed personal 
gain on the part of the fiduciary-like person who is alleged to be a 
misappropriating tipper. The Court, for instance, framed the 
misappropriation theory as “a fiduciary’s undisclosed, self-serving use 
of a principal’s information to purchase or sell securities, [which] . . . 
defrauds the principal of the exclusive use of that information.”182 Later 
in the opinion, the Court emphasized that “misappropriators . . . deal in 
deception. A fiduciary who ‘[pretends] loyalty to the principal while 
secretly converting the principal’s information for personal gain’ 
‘dupes’ or defrauds the principal.”183 And elsewhere, the Court 
observed that the “misappropriation theory bars only ‘trading on the 
basis of information that the wrongdoer converted to his own use in 
violation of some fiduciary, contractual, or similar obligation to the 
owner or rightful possessor of the information.’”184  
The O’Hagan Court’s repeated use of the term “conversion” is 
telling, as is the term “misappropriation” itself. An agent who 
recklessly disregards a likely harm to her principal may well be a 
wrongdoer under the law of agency because unauthorized 
communications of a principal’s secrets typically breach an agent’s 
 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at *42–43 (citing United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654–55 
(1997)). The comments to section 395 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency provides 
that a fiduciary “has a duty not to use the information acquired by [the fiduciary] as 
agent . . . for any purpose likely to cause [the] principal harm or to interfere with [the 
principal’s] business.” Id. at *42–43 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 
§ 395 cmt. a (1958)). 
 181. Id. at *45–46 (“David Yun was likely to suffer harm in his position as a 
senior corporate executive by his role in a chain of events that led to confidential 
corporate information entrusted to him being disclosed (by Donna Yun) to a person 
(Burch) who used that information to trade the company’s securities.”). 
 182. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652 (emphasis added). 
 183. Id. at 653–54 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). 
 184. Id. at 663 (emphasis added). 
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duties of confidentiality and care.185 But unless motivated by personal 
gain, an agent’s disclosure to a third party would not breach her duties 
of trust and confidence. And without this secret breach of loyalty, the 
agent who disclosed that information would not be “feigning fidelity” 
to the information’s source.186 It is thus the disclosing agent’s unjust 
enrichment from the use of material nonpublic information that 
transforms a mere breach of care and confidentiality into a deceptive 
misappropriation in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.  
The court in Yun flatly rejected the SEC’s “harm to the principal” 
argument because it recognized that undisclosed personal gain from the 
misuse of material nonpublic information constitutes the crux of 
O’Hagan’s misappropriation theory. As the Eleventh Circuit 
emphasized, “O’Hagan explicitly states or implicitly assumes that a 
misappropriator must gain personally from his trading on the 
confidential information.”187 The Yun court continued:  
If we were to hold that a misappropriator who tips—rather 
than trades—is liable even though he intends no personal 
benefit from his tip, then we would impose liability more 
readily for tipping than trading. Such a result would be 
absurd, and would undermine the Supreme Court’s rationale 
for imposing the benefit requirement in the first place: the 
desire to ensure that a tip rises to the level of a trade. . . . The 
better approach, in our view, is to follow Dirks and ensure 
that an outsider who tips must have done so with the intent of 
benefitting from the tippee’s trading.188 
The Yun court also reasoned that Dirks would be a “dead letter” if 
the SEC could avoid establishing the personal benefit element simply by 
proceeding under the misappropriation theory instead of the classical 
theory.189 That is, Yun recognized what securities law scholars have 
long pointed out: “Virtually all cases that could be brought [under the 
classical theory] can also be styled as misappropriation cases.”190  
 
 185. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08 (2005) (“[A]n agent 
has a duty to the principal to act with the care, competence, and diligence normally 
exercised by agents in similar circumstances.”). 
 186. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655. 
 187. SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1279 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id.  
 190. DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING: REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT 
& PREVENTION § 6-2 (West vol. 18, 2012); see also WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. 
STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING 492 (3rd ed. 2010) (“[I]n most instances, both the 
Commission and private plaintiffs could recast a classical special relationship cases as 
involving ‘misappropriation.’”).  
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In its final analysis, Yun concluded that the SEC’s evidence was 
sufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that the wife had expected to 
benefit from her tip to the codefendant “by maintaining a good 
relationship between a friend and frequent partner in real estate 
deals.”191 Thus, the agency emerged victorious notwithstanding the 
Eleventh Circuit’s clear dictate “that the SEC must prove that a 
misappropriator expected to benefit from the tip.”192 
3. PROVING IMPROPER PERSONAL GAIN FROM SELECTIVE DISCLOSURE 
Although misappropriation theory cases applying Dirks’ personal 
benefit test are replete with instances of tips deemed illegal,193 courts 
have yet to grapple with the test in the specific context of securities 
trading on the basis of material nonpublic government information. To 
be sure, in the few cases that have been brought against government 
insiders for illegal tipping, the defendants each appeared to have 
benefitted personally from his tip to the trading outsiders.194 But these 
personal benefits all took the form of explicit quid pro quos (meaning 
“to take this for a that”). For example, the leaker in Royer, an FBI 
agent, was promised a share of the trading profits generated from the 
use of that information as well as lucrative future employment,195 and 
the leaker in Peltz, a branch chief at the SEC, was enticed with the 
hiring of a prostitute.196 In both cases, the federal official’s exploitation 
of the government’s information breached the duty of loyalty at the 
center of Dirks and O’Hagan, and the failure to disclose that breach (by 
“feigning fidelity”) defrauded the agency and the federal government. 
Dirks also establishes that a federal official’s “gift of confidential 
information to a trading relative or friend” would constitute an indirect 
personal benefit that would likewise trigger a Rule 10b-5 disclosure 
obligation.197 Thus, the government insiders in 1789 who shared 
information with outsiders about Hamilton’s bond redemption plan 
likely engaged in illegal tipping under the federal securities law that 
 
 191. Yun, 327 F.3d at 1280. 
 192. Id. at 1275. 
 193. In addition to Yun, see SEC v. Rocklage, 470 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2006), and 
SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 2000). See also United States v. Rajaratnam, 
802 F. Supp. 2d 491, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that a reasonable jury could infer 
from a wiretapped call that the tipper and the tippee had a quid pro quo arrangement 
that satisfied the test for a personal benefit). 
 194. See, e.g., Haas v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462 (1910); United States v. Royer, 
549 F.3d 886 (2d Cir. 2008); supra notes 134–137 and accompanying text. 
 195. See supra notes 123–127 and accompanying text. 
 196. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
 197. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983). 
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exists today: the fact that many of the tippers also purchased bonds for 
themselves provides compelling evidence that they sought to “gift” the 
information to their Federalist friends. Absent such obvious gifts or 
explicit quid pro quos, how should Dirks apply to a federal official who 
conveys material nonpublic information to a government outsider who 
then trades?  
In the wake of the STOCK Act, several commentators have 
suggested that prosecutors and courts are likely to construe Dirks’ 
personal benefit test expansively in the context of tips involving 
government information. Professor Stephen Bainbridge, for instance, 
speculated that “[n]ow that Congress is covered by the insider-trading 
law, if a member of Congress gives a tip to a hedge fund manager, that 
is going to be illegal,”198 provided that the SEC or DOJ can show “that 
the Member got a personal benefit from making the tip, such as a 
political contribution, log-rolling support for legislation, or enhanced 
reputation.”199 John Berlau, a senior fellow at the Competitive 
Enterprise Institute, expressed the fear that congressional staffers could 
be prosecuted simply for facilitating the legislative agenda of the 
senator or representative who employs them: 
Presumably, if a congressional staffer helps his or her boss 
win a major legislative battle, that staffer’s reputation would 
rise—and, quite possibly, so would his or her future earnings. 
Thus, if a congressional staffer discloses, say, a nonpublic 
draft bill to a think-tanker or activist for the purpose of aiding 
the recipient’s efforts to support or defeat the legislation, it is 
certainly plausible that a court might find that the disclosure 
was for personal benefit. 200 
Others have zeroed in on politicians and their continual need to 
raise campaign funds, with one attorney bemoaning that “[w]here the 
recipient of the information is a past or future campaign contributor, a 
fact finder might be asked to infer the requisite intent to benefit 
 
 198. Mullins & Ackerman, supra note 28. 
 199. Stephen Bainbridge, Quoted re STOCK Act’s Impact on Political 
Intelligence, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Feb. 16, 2012, 11:18 AM), 
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 200. John Berlau, The STOCK Act and the SEC, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Feb. 
21, 2012, 2:00 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/291570/stock-act-and-
sec-john-berlau?pg=2. 
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established by that fact alone, even without any direct evidence of a 
quid pro quo.”201 He therefore warns that:  
Given the very wide net potentially cast by insider trading 
law, one can expect prosecutors and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission to take the position that under the 
STOCK Act, if a member or staff person discloses to a 
member of the public material nonpublic information obtained 
during the course of the member or staff’s congressional 
duties, and the constituent trades on the information, both the 
member and the constituent have committed insider trading.202  
Another attorney, referencing the difficulties that inhere in making 
determinations of materiality, went so far as to advise securities traders 
“to treat all non-public information learned from a member of Congress 
or their staff as material confidential information subject to the 
restrictions of the [STOCK Act].”203  
We highly doubt, for several reasons, that securities law enforcers 
and courts will construe Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in a manner that 
validates these predictions and cautionary warnings. Instead, we would 
expect to see SEC and DOJ prosecutions of federal officials (or 
securities traders who use government information) only in those rare 
instances involving either gifts of information to relatives or personal 
friends, or explicit quid pro quos involving identifiable personal 
benefits beyond enhanced reputations and the mere possibility of future 
political support or campaign contributions. We draw our analysis from 
three distinct areas: the SEC’s experience with selective disclosure in 
the private sector, the constitutional limitations that courts have placed 
on other statutes that implicate political speech and other interactions 
between government officials and members of the public, and the 
STOCK Act’s “Rule of Construction” provision. 
a. An object lesson from the private sector  
Although a full exploration of selective disclosure in the private 
sector is set forth in Part II, its object lesson can be encapsulated here. 
 
 201. Peter G. Neiman, Is the STOCK Act Constitutional?, N.Y. L.J.  
(Mar. 27, 2012), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/ 
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THOMSON REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT (May 17, 2012), 
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Until Regulation FD took effect in 2000, securities issuers and their 
corporate executives routinely put ordinary investors at a disadvantage 
by leaking material nonpublic information about corporate earnings and 
other developments to securities analysts who shared the information 
with professional investors who then traded. The SEC’s struggle to end 
selective disclosure in the private sector demonstrates that 
communications, which arguably serve legitimate purposes, will 
effectively escape regulation under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. As 
Part II elucidates, Dirks created an antifraud safe harbor that insulates 
most communications between corporate executives and securities 
analysts because its personal benefit test implicates only those 
disclosures that evidenced a breach of an insider’s duty of loyalty. And 
corporate officials who have business-related reasons for sharing 
material nonpublic information with securities analysts are not acting 
disloyally (i.e., in breach of their duty of trust and confidence), even if 
their own professional reputations are enhanced along the way.  
Dirks’ safe harbor for selective disclosure in the public sector 
likely runs even wider and deeper than it does in the corporate world 
because goodwill, professional reputation, and fundraising are integral 
parts of American politics. The member of Congress, the legislative 
aide, the Cabinet official, or the agency staff member who briefs 
interested parties on the status of pending legislation or regulation is 
making the operations of government more transparent (albeit 
selectively and thus, oftentimes, unfairly vis-à-vis the rest of the 
public).204 Additionally, through the solicitation of feedback, the federal 
official may be making the government more effective.205 It is hardly 
surprising that goodwill, enhanced professional reputation, or future 
political support or campaign contributions typically result from those 
interchanges. But the relevant question under Dirks and O’Hagan is 
whether these results constitute improper personal benefits: do they 
evidence a breach of the federal official’s duty of loyalty through his or 
her misuse of the government’s information?206 In the context of a 
political system that turns on electoral campaigns financed largely 
through individual and corporate donations, these typical upshots of 
meetings and briefings are not likely to be construed as “exploitation of 
nonpublic information” for personal gain absent clear evidence of an 
 
 204. See infra Part III.A. 
 205. See supra note 121.  
 206. See infra note 283 and accompanying text (pointing to Justice Harry 
Blackmun’s observation in Dirks that an enhanced reputation in the abstract was not 
sufficient to satisfy the majority’s own test for fraudulent tipping). 
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explicit quid pro quo.207 Thus, as they do with communications between 
corporate executives and securities analysts, Dirks and O’Hagan set a 
standard that renders most selective disclosures of nonpublic 
government information—and most securities trading based on such 
disclosures—beyond the reach of the prohibitions in Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5.  
b. Constitutional considerations  
Even if courts and securities law enforcers were otherwise inclined 
to view enhanced reputation and the possibility of future political 
support or campaign contributions as improper personal benefits within 
the meaning of Dirks and O’Hagan, constitutional considerations 
would, in many instances, preclude them from doing so. Indeed, the 
Constitution requires substantial “breathing space”208 for 
communications between federal officials and members of the public 
because “speech on public issues occupies ‘the highest rung of the 
hierarchy of First Amendment values,’ and is entitled to special 
protection.”209 This special protection for political speech takes the 
form of strict scrutiny and is warranted because “speech concerning 
public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-
government.”210 Thus, in drawing the line between fraudulent tipping 
and unfair selective disclosure, “the First Amendment requires [courts] 
to err on the side of protecting political speech rather than suppressing 
it.”211  
Interactions between federal officials and the media are yet another 
area in which First Amendment protections are likely to apply. The 
right to freedom of the press would make it exceedingly difficult for the 
SEC or DOJ to prosecute journalists for republishing nonpublic 
market-moving government information212 and this protection would 
likely extend to financial newsletters, including those having a narrow 
subscription base principally of hedge funds and other professional 
investors.213 It is also highly unlikely that the SEC or DOJ would 
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pursue legal actions against federal officials for selective disclosure in 
circumstances where related actions against the media organizations or 
their subscribers for trading on the information would be 
unsuccessful.214 
In addition to the heightened constitutional scrutiny that is 
accorded to political speech and a free press, several other 
constitutional protections militate in favor of a narrow construction of 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when the selective disclosure of 
government information is at issue. The First Amendment likewise 
protects “the right of the people . . . to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances”215 and, as constitutional scholars have observed, 
the Petitions Clause has been treated as a right “to participate fully in 
the political process, free from threats or reprisals.”216 Communications 
with members of Congress or their staffs and members of the public 
may also draw special protection from the Speech or Debate Clause,217 
which extends not only to actual speech or debate by members of 
Congress, but also to those actions (including actions by staffers) 
“related to the due functioning of the legislative process.”218 In 
addition, our representative democracy, which is reflected in the 
Constitution’s very structure, may warrant a narrow interpretation of 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 that avoids undue interference with 
interactions between federal officials and citizen-investors.  
Although the Constitution’s interplay with Dirks and O’Hagan has 
yet to be explored in a government tipping case, personal benefit 
questions arise frequently in other political corruption cases and courts 
have taken great care to avoid construing federal statutes, such as those 
 
 214. However, as illustrated by the recent phone-hacking scandal in the United 
Kingdom involving the Murdoch press organization, there are limits to what the press 
can do to obtain government information: even the press cannot pay bribes to 
governmental officials in return for information. See Amy Chozick, A Scandal Starts to 
Hem in Murdoch’s Empire, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2012, at A1. 
 215. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 216. James E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition: Toward 
a First Amendment Right to Pursue Judicial Claims against the Government, 91 NW. U. 
L. REV. 899, 904 (1997). 
 217. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (“[F]or any Speech or Debate in either 
House, [Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place.”). 
 218. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 172 (1966); see also United 
States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 512 (1972) (“A legislative act has consistently been 
defined as an act generally done in Congress in relation to the business before it.”); 
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 618 (1972) (“[T]he Speech or Debate Clause 
applies not only to a Member but also to his aides insofar as the conduct of the latter 
would be a protected legislative act if performed by the Member himself.”).  
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that prohibit bribery,219 illegal gratuities,220 or extortion221 in a manner 
that criminalizes ordinary politics.222 Individuals and corporations, for 
example, have a First Amendment right to contribute to political 
campaigns and causes, and politicians have an ancillary right to solicit 
such contributions.223 The Supreme Court has therefore concluded that 
a connection between a campaign contribution and an official action can 
evidence a crime “only if the payments are made in return for an 
explicit promise or undertaking by the official to perform or not to 
perform an official act.”224 If federal statutes specifically designed to 
curtail political corruption cannot be construed in a way that 
unconstitutionally restricts or excessively chills the rights to free 
speech, expression, and political participation, surely the same is true 
for the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.  
c. The STOCK Act’s rule of construction  
The STOCK Act itself contains interpretative guidance when the 
communication of material nonpublic government information is at 
issue. Captioned a “Rule of Construction,” Section 10(2) provides that 
nothing in the Act shall be construed to “be in derogation of the 
obligations, duties, and functions of a Member of Congress, an 
 
 219. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)(a) (2006) (making it a crime for both the offeror 
and the public official to corruptly engage in a transfer of anything of value with the 
intent to influence any official act). 
 220. § 201(c) (making it a crime to provide (or accept) a gratuity “for or 
because of” the official’s performance of an official act “otherwise than as provided by 
law for the proper discharge of official duty”). 
 221. Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)-(b) (2006) (making it a crime to obtain 
property with the consent of the victim “under color of official right”). 
 222. See PETER J. HENNING & LEE J. RADEK, THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE 
OF PUBLIC CORRUPTION 37–47, 107–121 (2011). Despite the care taken, many have 
urged the Supreme Court to better clarify what constitutes quid pro quo corruption. 
See, e.g., Brief of Richard F. Scruggs as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 
Siegelman v. United States, No. 11-955 (U.S. Mar. 1, 2012), 2012 WL 707060 at 
*17–19. See generally Daniel H. Lowenstein, When Is a Campaign Contribution a 
Bribe?, in PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CORRUPTION 127 (William C. Heffernan & John 
Kleining eds., 2004). 
 223. See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22 (1976) (“Making a 
contribution, like joining a political party, serves to affiliate a person with a candidate. 
In addition, it enables like-minded persons to pool their resources in furtherance of 
common political goals.”). 
 224. McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 273 (1991) (emphasis 
added); see also United States v. Allen, 10 F.3d 405, 411 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[A]ccepting 
a campaign contribution does not equal taking a bribe unless the payment is made in 
exchange for an explicit promise to perform or not perform an official act. Vague 
expectations of some future benefit should not be sufficient to make a payment a 
bribe.”). 
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employee of Congress, an executive branch employee, a judicial 
officer, or a judicial employee, arising from such person’s official 
position.”225 A construction of the Act’s “duty of trust and confidence” 
that renders enhanced reputation and the mere possibility of future 
political support or campaign contributions as improper personal 
benefits within the meaning of Dirks and O’Hagan could well impede 
federal officials from functioning effectively. Government functions 
could be impeded because federal officials would operate under the 
cloud of a possible fraud prosecution whenever they reveal nonpublic 
information in meetings or briefings with members of the public who 
could trade securities. As Part III explains, federal officials have a host 
of legitimate reasons for selectively sharing nonpublic information with 
broad ranges of individuals and entities.226 
The legislative history concerning Section 10 of the STOCK Act is 
sparse. The little that exists consists primarily of a colloquy between 
Senators Harry Reid and Joseph Lieberman that occurred immediately 
before the Senate’s final vote on the Act.227 Senator Reid began the 
exchange with the observation that “the STOCK Act should not be 
interpreted as limiting government transparency in any way. Discourse 
with the public, whether privately or publicly, is vital to maintaining a 
healthy democratic society.”228 Senator Lieberman concurred, 
emphasizing his “agree[ment] that the STOCK Act is not intended 
to . . . hinder dissemination of information to interested parties 
regarding Congressional activities and deliberations.”229 Both senators 
then sought to ameliorate concerns about “significant chilling effect[s]” 
by referencing conversations with the SEC that “explicitly clarified that 
it does not view the STOCK Act as creating new limitations on the 
disclosure of Congressional information in conversations with 
constituents.”230  
The STOCK Act’s Rule of Construction, read in light of this 
legislative history, reflects an intention by Congress to insulate from 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liability at least some communications 
that federal officials can be expected to make in the course of their 
official duties. It therefore obliges courts, as well as the SEC and the 
 
 225. STOCK Act, Pub. L. No. 112-105, § 10(2), 126 Stat. 291, 298 (2012) (to 
be codified at 5 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)). 
 226. See infra Part III.A. 
 227. See Robert L. Walker, The STOCK Act: Insider Trading on Government 
Information; Corporate and Individual Compliance Concerns, WILEY REIN LLP (Apr. 
4, 2012), www.wileyrein.com/publications.cfm?sp=articles&id=7953. 
 228. 158 CONG. REC. S1980 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 2012) (statement of Sen. 
Harry Reid). 
 229. Id. (statement of Sen. Joseph Lieberman). 
 230. Id. (statement of Sen. Harry Reid). 
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DOJ, to proceed with extraordinary care in distinguishing between 
fraudulent tipping and lawful, though frequently unfair, selective 
disclosure.  
C. Legislative Proposals beyond the STOCK Act  
The STOCK Act includes an important provision requiring the 
Comptroller General, who heads the GAO, to perform a study and 
report to Congress within one year “on the role of political intelligence 
in the financial markets.”231 The report must discuss, among other 
matters, the extent to which securities investors are buying and relying 
on political intelligence, and the “legal and practical issues that may be 
raised by the imposition of disclosure requirements on those who 
engage in political intelligence activities.”232 The Act defines “political 
intelligence” as: 
information that is—(1) derived by a person from direct 
communications with an executive branch employee, a 
Member of Congress, or an employee of Congress; and (2) 
provided in exchange for financial compensation to a client 
who intends, and who is known to intend, to use the 
information to inform investment decisions.233 
This mandate for a GAO study replaced two related proposals for 
legislative action in earlier iterations of the STOCK Act, including the 
original version, which was introduced in the House in 2006 by United 
States Representatives Brian Baird (D-Wash.) and Louise M. Slaughter 
(D-N.Y.).234 One proposal would have applied the Lobbying Disclosure 
Act (LDA)235 to political intelligence consultants, requiring them to 
register and make public disclosures about their political intelligence 
activities.236 The other proposal would have amended the federal 
securities laws to include a broad ban on securities trading on the basis 
of material nonpublic government information.237 Although both 
proposals are well-intentioned attempts to go beyond the STOCK Act to 
curtail securities trading on selectively disclosed government 
 
 231. STOCK Act, Pub. L. No. 112-105, § 7(a)(1), 126 Stat. 291, 294 (2012). 
The Act requires the Comptroller General to work in consultation with the 
Congressional Research Service. Id. 
 232. § 7(a)(2)(F).  
 233. § 7(b).  
 234. STOCK Act, H.R. 5015, 109th Cong. (2006). 
 235. Lobbying and Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. § 1601 (2006). 
 236. H.R. 5015 § 4. 
 237. H.R. 5015 § 2(a). 
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information, each places the burden entirely on the private sector and 
neither tackles the problem at its root, which is the federal 
government’s own lack of effective internal controls regarding its 
dissemination of material nonpublic information.  
1. REGISTRATION AND DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS FOR POLITICAL 
INTELLIGENCE CONSULTANTS 
Both the original Baird-Slaughter STOCK Act bill and the version 
of the bill that passed the Senate on February 2, 2012, contained a 
provision that would have regulated political intelligence gathering in a 
manner similar to lobbying activity.238 Specifically, the political 
intelligence provision in the Senate’s bill of February 2, 2012 (which 
passed as an amendment sponsored by Senator Grassley239), would have 
amended the LDA to require registration of “political intelligence 
firm[s]” and public reporting of “political intelligence activities.”240 
Political intelligence activities included “political intelligence contacts” 
as well as “efforts in support of such contacts.”241 And the term 
“political intelligence contact” was broadly defined to include “any oral 
or written communication . . . to or from a covered executive branch 
official or a covered legislative branch official” that results in 
information “intended for use in analyzing securities or commodities 
markets, or in informing investment decisions, and which is made on 
behalf of a client” regarding: (1) “the formulation, modification, or 
adoption” of any federal legislation “including legislative proposals;” 
(2) any “Federal rule, regulation . . . policy, or position of the United 
 
 238. H.R. 5015; 158 CONG. REC. S310–15 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 2012). 
Representatives Baird and Slaughter reintroduced a similar bill in 2009. H.R. 682, 
111th Cong. (2009). In 2011, the bill was again reintroduced with Representative Tim 
Walz (D-Minn.) joining Slaughter as its principal cosponsor after Representative 
Baird’s retirement from office. H.R. 1148, 112th Cong. (2011); see also Nagy, supra 
note 25, at 1130–31 (recounting the STOCK Act’s origins). The STOCK Act bill that 
passed the Senate on February 2, 2012, was brought to the floor by the Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, led by Chairman Joseph Lieberman (I-
Conn.) and ranking member Susan Collins (R-Me.). 158 CONG. REC. S310 (daily ed. 
Feb. 2, 2012). Senators Kirsten Gillibrand (D-N.Y.) and Scott Brown (R-Mass.) were 
the lead Senate co-sponsors. Id. at S291. 
 239. 158 CONG. REC. S296–97 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 2012) (statement of Sen. 
Charles Grassley). 
 240. Id. at S313. The term “political intelligence firm” is defined to mean “a 
person or entity that has 1 or more employees who are political intelligence consultants 
to a client other than that person or entity” and the term “political intelligence 
consultant” is defined to mean “any individual who is employed or retained by a client 
for financial or other compensation for services that include one or more political 
intelligence contacts.’’ Id. (emphasis added). 
 241. Id. 
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States Government;” or (3) “the administration or execution of a 
Federal program or policy,” including contracts, grants, loans, and 
licenses.242 Communications made by or to media representatives, 
however, would not be deemed a political intelligence contact, “if the 
purpose of the communication is gathering and disseminating news and 
information to the public.”243  
The Senate’s proposed political intelligence provision was then 
dropped from the STOCK Act bill that passed the House by a vote of 
417-2 on February 9, 2012.244 Although many members in both 
chambers had urged the creation of a joint conference committee to 
reconcile the differences between the House and Senate versions,245 
Senate leadership instead chose to vote on the bill that the House had 
passed without any further amendments.246 This House version—with 
the GAO study, but without the section regulating political 
intelligence—passed the Senate 96-3 on March 22, 2012,247 and the bill 
became law on April 4, 2012.248  
Notwithstanding Congress’s decision in the STOCK Act to study 
political intelligence before attempting to regulate it, legislative efforts 
to require registration and reporting have continued. In the House, 
Congresswoman Slaughter, together with her colleagues Tim Walz 
(D-Minn.) and Mike Quigley (D-Ill.), are cosponsoring the Restore 
Public Trust Act, which includes a section that would apply the LDA to 
political intelligence firms;249 in the Senate, Charles Grassley and 
Kirsten Gillibrand (D-N.Y.) are expected to introduce their own bill.250 
Describing the GAO study as a way to “kick[] the can down the road 
for another year,”251 Senator Grassley is urging speedy action for a 
“straightforward” reason: “if trades are taking place based on ‘political 
 
 242. Id. (emphasis added).  
 243. Id.  
 244. 158 CONG. REC. H645–48, H657 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2012); see also 
Rachel Bade, Two Senators Blast Cantor over Dropped Provisions in Insider-Trading 
Bill, CQ TODAY, Feb. 8, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 308486. 
 245. See Richard E. Cohen, Lawmakers Push for Conference Committee on 
Insider-Trading Measure, CQ TODAY, Feb. 16, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 
3767180.  
 246. See Pear, supra note 23. 
 247. 158 CONG. REC. S1981 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 2012). 
 248. Remarks on Signing the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 
2012, 2012 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 247 (Apr. 4, 2012), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201200247/pdf/DCPD-201200247.pdf. 
 249. H.R. 4054, 112th Cong. § 101 (2012). 
 250. See Bridgette Blair, STOCK Act Becomes Law, PUBLIC CITIZEN NEWS, 
May/June 2012, at 1, 16. 
 251. 158 CONG. REC. S1966 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 2012) (statement of Sen. 
Charles Grassley).  
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intelligence’ . . . obtained from Congress or the executive branch, 
people in this country should know who is gathering such 
information.”252 
At first blush, requiring public reporting of certain political 
intelligence activities seems sensible, because the information in those 
reports would put federal officials, the media, and the general public on 
notice as to the persons and entities seeking to profit from selective 
disclosure. But, as with most legislation, the devil is in the details and 
the details contained in the new Slaughter-Walz-Quigley bill—which 
mirrors the political intelligence section that was omitted from the 
STOCK Act—raise a host of concerns.  
One concern involves the scope of the phrase “political intelligence 
contacts.”253 The definition is considerably overinclusive, extending 
well beyond the firms and persons performing the type of 
behind-closed-doors gathering and/or brokering of inside connections 
that has been profiled in the media.254 The proposed legislation’s 
sweeping registration requirement, coupled with its cumbersome 
reporting obligations, will likely burden a wide range of persons who 
are principally interested in gathering information as to what their 
government is doing. While these people may be engaged in securities 
or commodities trading, they may also be engaged in affecting change 
for the public interest.  
Consider a private foundation, a university, a church, or some 
other organization that is interested in learning about how government 
activities will affect commercial or societal interests that are vital to the 
organization. Assume the organization also invests in the securities 
markets. If the organization hires a person to gather information about 
prospective government policies, does that person have to register and 
report? The proposed definition of “political intelligence activities” 
focuses on information gathered for the purpose of investment decisions 
and the person gathering the information may have been hired 
principally to help the organization form a strategy for responding to 
government actions. But the gatherer also may have no idea how the 
information will actually, or ultimately, be used. Accordingly, to be on 
the safe side, the gatherer may feel compelled to register as a political 
intelligence consultant simply because his or her client trades in 
securities markets. Then, whenever the registered consultant has a 
“political intelligence contact,” he or she will have to report both the 
nature of the contact and the client who is benefitting from that contact. 
 
 252. 158 CONG. REC. S487 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2012) (statement of Sen. Charles 
Grassley). 
 253. See supra note 242 and accompanying text. 
 254. See supra Part I.A.2–3.  
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Moreover, the proposed definition of a “political intelligence 
consultant”—which extends to a person who simply makes a single 
contact requesting information from a federal official255—is far more 
expansive than the LDA’s definition of “lobbyist,” which excludes any 
“individual whose lobbying activities constitute less than 20 percent of 
the time engaged in the services provided by such individual to [a] 
client over a 3-month period.”256  
Another concern involves the linkage of “political intelligence 
contacts” to any information informing an “investment decision,” even 
if that decision is not in any way related to securities trading. Consider 
a manufacturing corporation that hires a consultant to meet with senior 
officials at the EPA to garner insights about environmental compliance. 
Assume the corporation receives some guidance and then makes a 
capital investment decision based on what the consultant reports. Or 
consider a businessperson who retains someone to meet with her 
congressman to inquire about whether military base X is likely to be 
closed. Assume that the businessperson learns that the base is likely to 
remain open and then she uses that information to decide whether to 
invest in a new store in location A near base X. These are surely 
investment decisions, but posing those questions to a member of 
Congress and making investment decisions based on that information 
hardly undermines investor confidence in the securities markets or in 
government. Yet, the information gatherers may well be obliged to 
register and report under the Slaughter-Walz-Quigley bill as currently 
written.  
On the other hand, people truly in the political intelligence 
business will have an incentive to avoid registration and reporting under 
the LDA and they will be eager to capitalize on statutory loopholes. 
The proposed blanket exemption for the media257 is one potential 
avenue of abuse because many news outlets serve a narrow subscription 
base of securities investors or give high-paying subscribers early notice 
of news developments.258 Differentiating among news organizations—
and requiring some to register and allowing others to use the 
exemption—is not something any government official should be 
expected to do without bias and trepidation. News organizations often 
have an enormous influence over whether government officials get to 
keep their jobs.   
It is possible, of course, that with the benefit of insight and 
guidance from the GAO study, these and other drafting issues can be 
 
 255. See supra note 240 and accompanying text. 
 256. Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. § 1602(10) (2006). 
 257. See supra note 243 and accompanying text.  
 258. See infra Part III.B.6. 
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resolved in a manner that would focus more precisely on regulating the 
professional political intelligence consultants who comprise the industry 
generating more than a $100 million annually.259 But no amount of 
targeted sunshine on the political intelligence industry will be an 
adequate substitute for better internal controls on the federal 
government’s own dissemination of material nonpublic information.  
2. AN OUTRIGHT BAN ON SECURITIES TRADING BASED ON MATERIAL 
NONPUBLIC GOVERNMENT INFORMATION 
In addition to a section regulating political intelligence, prior 
versions of the STOCK Act also included a section that would have 
effectively banned any hedge fund, professional investor, or individual 
investor from trading securities on the basis of material nonpublic 
government information. For instance, the Slaughter-Walz bill,260 which 
garnered a remarkable 285 cosponsors in the House in the aftermath of 
the 60 Minutes segment,261 would have required the SEC to promulgate 
new rules under Section 10 of the Exchange Act prohibiting “any 
person from buying or selling the securities or security-based swaps of 
any issuer while such person is in possession of material nonpublic 
information” derived from Federal employment and relating to such 
information, if such person knew “that the information was so 
obtained” from a federal officer or employee.262 Thus, under the broad 
statutory language in this proposed provision, liability for insider 
trading would not have turned on a showing that a federal officer or 
employee had breached a duty of trust and confidence in selectively 
disclosing the information to the person who traded. Instead, the 
proposed ban on securities trading would have extended even to 
 
 259. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 260. H.R. 1148, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 261. See supra note 21; H.R. 1148 – STOCK bill (“STOCK Act”), 
OPENCONGRESS, http://www.opencongress.org/bill/112-h1148/show (last visited Nov. 
10, 2012). 
 262. H.R. 1148 § 2(b). The bill proposed amending the Exchange Act with a 
new Section 10(d), captioned “Nonpublic Information Relating to Congress,” and a 
new Section 10(e), captioned “Nonpublic Information Relating to Other Federal 
Employees.” Id. However, as proposed, Section 10(d)’s application to Congress would 
have extended the trading prohibition only to material nonpublic information “relating 
to any pending or prospective legislation action relating to such issuer.” Id.; see also 
Bainbridge, supra note 25, at 306 (pointing out that much market-moving congressional 
knowledge does not in any way pertain to legislative action); Nagy, supra note 25, at 
1133–34.  
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material nonpublic government information that been disclosed to a 
recipient in good faith for an entirely legitimate reason.263 
An outright ban on securities trading while a person is aware of 
material nonpublic information obtained from federal officials would 
have been a radical departure from existing federal securities law, to 
say the least. Had Congress adopted this ban, it would have essentially 
reinstated, for government information, the parity-of-information 
approach to securities fraud liability that the Court had rejected 
emphatically in Chiarella.264 The federal law governing insider trading 
in securities is confusing enough without dual tracks setting forth 
different prohibitions based on the identity of the source of the 
information.265 
Beyond that, an outright ban on securities trading while a person is 
aware of material nonpublic information obtained from federal 
officials—which would be enforceable through SEC or DOJ actions—
would undoubtedly discourage many citizens from using lawful means 
to gather political information. Many people could fear that federal 
officials would respond to their efforts by encouraging an SEC or DOJ 
investigation into their investment activities. The result would likely be 
a government that is far less transparent to its constituents and 
securities markets that are substantially less efficient.266 Our proposed 
 
 263. Just like in Rule 14e-3 insider trading cases involving tender offer-related 
information, the proposed ban could have extended even to material nonpublic 
government information that had been overheard in a Capitol Hill restaurant, provided 
that the lucky listener knew that his source was a federal officer or employee. Cf. 
United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 557 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc) (“Rule 14e-3 is 
a disclosure provision. It creates a duty in those traders who fall within its ambit to 
abstain or disclose, without regard to whether the trader owes a pre-existing fiduciary 
duty to respect the confidentiality of the information.”). The SEC Exchange Act 
Section 14(e)’s authority to regulate securities trading in the context of tender offers, 
however, is considerably broader than its authority to regulate fraudulent securities 
trading under Section 10(b). See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 673 (1997). 
 264. See supra notes 151–152 and accompanying text.  
 265. For critical assessments of existing jurisprudence, see, for example, Jill E. 
Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for Insider Trading Regulation, 
26 GA. L. REV. 179, 179 (1991) (“[T]he legal restrictions on trading securities while in 
possession of material nonpublic information are confused and confusing.”); Thomas 
Lee Hazen, Identifying the Duty Prohibiting Outsider Trading on Material Nonpublic 
Information, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 881, 883 (2010) (observing that there are “hundreds of 
decisions grappling” with insider trading’s fraud-based rubric and that “[m]any of these 
decisions are confusing and inconsistent with one another”); and Saikrishna Prakash, 
Our Dysfunctional Insider Trading Regime, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1491, 1498 (1999) 
(“[T]he SEC’s dysfunctional regulatory strategy brings to mind unpleasant images of 
Cinderella’s stepsisters who each chopped off portions of a foot in order to stuff the 
foot into Cinderella’s shoe.”). 
 266. See infra notes 284–286 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s 
concern in Dirks that an overly broad insider trading prohibition would deter analysts 
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FGD regime—which attends to the way in which government insiders 
disclose information, rather than what the way in which outsiders 
gather and use that information—provides a superior alternative. 
II. SELECTIVE DISCLOSURE IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
Our law has no tolerance for favoritism. It holds no place for 
privilege. Everyone deserves a fair shot at success in our 
nation’s securities markets. Well-connected people don’t 
deserve any greater chance for success than the average 
citizen. Nor do the friends and relatives of those well-placed 
people, who may reap unfair profits because they happen to 
know the news before it breaks. The process of capital 
formation is not an insider’s game run for a select group of 
those “in the know.” It’s an expression of our democracy’s 
faith in fundamental fairness. It’s simply a question of 
integrity. 
  —SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt267 
SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt’s remarks could well have been 
directed at federal officials who facilitate securities trading on the basis 
of selectively disclosed government information. But when he was 
admonishing favoritism and privilege in February 1998, his appeal to 
integrity was targeted at corporate officials in the private sector and 
their lawyers. Securities analysts and professional investors had been 
reaping enormous profits from trading on the basis of nonpublic 
corporate information pertaining to earnings and other developments, 
which CEOs and other executives had been sharing routinely in 
advance of public announcements. The SEC considered such selective 
disclosure to be an unfair practice that undermined investor confidence 
in the securities markets. But it was struggling to prevent it because 
these executives were rarely misusing the issuer’s information in 
violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.  
Regulation FD created new disclosure obligations on the part of 
publicly traded companies and thereby eliminated special trading 
 
from gathering corporate information, which is an activity essential to the preservation 
of efficient securities markets); Donald C. Langevoort, Investment Analysts and the 
Law of Insider Trading, 76 VA. L. REV. 1023, 1024 (1990) (observing that Dirks, and 
much of the academic commentary that followed sought legal rules that would 
encourage searches for useful and accurate information, which would in turn be 
“reflected in the prevailing market price of the issuer’s securities, to society’s benefit”).  
 267. Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC, A Question of Integrity: Promoting 
Investor Confidence by Fighting Insider Trading, SEC Speaks Conference (Feb. 27, 
1998). 
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privileges for securities analysts and their clients. The result is that 
today, more than a decade later, investors operate on a playing field 
that is no longer as tilted toward those with special access to corporate 
executives. But this positive development did not result from the 
application of laws proscribing insider trading. Instead, securities 
markets became fairer only when the SEC turned its focus to regulating 
issuers and the means and manner by which they disclose material 
nonpublic information. Given the federal government’s own problems 
with unfair selective disclosure, the private sector’s experience is 
enormously instructive.  
A. Corporate Executives and Securities Analysts 
1. THE SAFE HARBOR IN DIRKS 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Dirks v. SEC, securities 
analysts enjoyed no particular privilege vis-à-vis the insider trading 
prohibitions arising under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Throughout 
the 1970s, lower courts and the SEC embraced the so-called 
parity-of-information approach to insider trading,268 and this broad 
interpretation of Rule 10b-5 liability essentially prohibited analysts and 
their clients from trading securities based on material nonpublic 
information that had been selectively disclosed by corporate officials. 
Even in this pre-classical theory period, courts had recognized that 
analysts performed “a needed service in culling and sifting available 
data, viewing it in light of their own knowledge of a particular industry 
and ultimately furnishing a distilled product in the form of reports.”269 
But those valuable contributions to market efficiency were not viewed 
as a reason for relaxing the parity-of-information rule. Thus, corporate 
executives who shared material nonpublic information with securities 
analysts incurred liability for illegal tipping and the securities analysts 
or clients who traded on the basis of selectively disclosed information 
incurred liability for illegal trading.270 As famously characterized by the 
 
 268. See supra note 151 and accompanying text (quoting the Second Circuit’s 
holding in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968)). 
 269. SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226, 1230 (S.D.N.Y. 
1976), aff’d, 565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 270. See, e.g., Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 167–68 (2d 
Cir. 1980) (Chief Financial Officer violated Rule 10b-5 when he responded to an 
analyst’s question with the material nonpublic information that earnings would be 
down); Bausch, 565 F.2d at 18–19 (corporate executive violated Rule 10b-5 by sharing 
material nonpublic information with analyst, but holding that the SEC’s request for an 
injunction was not warranted); SEC v. Geon Industries, Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 42–43 (2d 
Cir. 1976) (CEO violated Rule 10b-5 by disclosing merger-related information in 
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Second Circuit in SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc,271 discussions were 
akin to “a fencing match conducted on a tightrope” where corporate 
executives were “compelled to parry often incisive questioning [by 
securities analysts] while teetering on the fine line between data 
properly conveyed and material inside information that may not be 
revealed without simultaneously disclosing it to the public.”272 
When the Court decided Dirks in 1983, however, insider trading 
liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 was grounded entirely in 
Chiarella’s classical theory,273 which focused on the breach of a 
disclosure duty arising from a relationship of trust and confidence 
“between the shareholders of a corporation and those insiders who have 
obtained confidential information by reason of their position with that 
corporation.”274 But Dirks then extended Chiarella’s holding to certain 
tippees of corporate insiders who could be viewed as coparticipants in 
an insider’s breach of duty to shareholders.275 And, according to Dirks, 
disclosure by an insider to a person outside the corporation constituted 
a breach of duty only when the insider was acting for a direct or 
indirect personal benefit.276  
The Dirks case had been a pivotal one for the securities industry 
because the petitioner, Raymond Dirks, was a securities analyst who 
had advised clients to sell securities based on highly negative 
information relayed to him by corporate executives.277 The SEC urged 
the Court to hold the analyst liable under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
for “aiding and abetting” his clients’ trading.278 But pursuant to its 
 
response to “broker’s questions” posed by a registered representative who then traded 
for himself and seventeen clients); SEC v. Lum’s, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046, 1058 
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (issuer and its President/Chief Operating Officer violated Rule 10b-5 
when disclosures were made to an institutional salesman, who shared the material 
nonpublic information with trading clients); Investors Mgmt. Co., 44 S.E.C. 633,  
645–46 (1971) (investment advisers violated Rule 10b-5 when they traded securities on 
the basis of material nonpublic information obtained from broker-dealer retained by 
securities issuer); see also Langevoort, supra note 266, at 1027 (discussing selective 
disclosure in the early stages of Rule 10b-5’s doctrinal development). 
 271. 565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 272. Id. at 9. Teetering was necessary because, even under a 
parity-of-information view of insider trading, analysts were allowed to obtain 
immaterial nonpublic information for purposes of “filling interstices in analysis.” 
Investors Mgmt. Co., 44 S.E.C. at 646. 
 273. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659 (1983). 
 274. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980).  
 275. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664. 
 276. See supra Part I.B.2.  
 277. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 648–51. 
 278. Id. at 651 (quoting the SEC’s position that “[w]here ‘tippees’—regardless 
of their motivation or occupation—come into possession of material ‘corporate 
information that they know is confidential and know or should know came from a 
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personal benefit test for tipper/tippee liability, the Court found that the 
analyst had no duty to abstain from using the information.279 The 
information pertained to a widespread fraud that had been occurring at 
the Equity Funding Corporation, and the Court found that the current 
and former insiders who had revealed the fraud to the analyst had not 
acted improperly for a personal benefit.280 As the Court explained:  
The tippers received no monetary or personal benefit for 
revealing Equity Funding’s secrets, nor was their purpose to 
make a gift of valuable information to Dirks. As the facts of 
this case clearly indicate, the tippers were motivated by a 
desire to expose the fraud. In the absence of a breach of duty 
to shareholders by the insiders, there was no derivative breach 
by Dirks. Dirks therefore could not have been “a participant 
after the fact in [an] insider’s breach of a fiduciary duty.”281 
In so holding, the Court recognized that the analyst’s clients 
possessed an informational advantage over all other traders who lacked 
knowledge about Equity Funding’s likely demise. But the Court 
observed that “winner and losers” are inevitable in markets where 
investors act on incomplete or incorrect information, and it emphasized 
that “those who have ‘lost’ have not necessarily been defrauded.”282 
Significantly, as Justice Blackmun observed in his dissent, the former 
officer of Equity Funding who revealed the ongoing fraud had also, in a 
sense, benefitted personally from “the good feeling of exposing a fraud 
and his enhanced reputation.283 Thus, in Dirks itself, an “enhanced 
reputation” in the abstract did not constitute an improper personal 
benefit triggering a disclose or abstain obligation under Section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5.  
Underscoring much of the analysis in Dirks was the Court’s 
twofold concern for market efficiency and predictable rules for Rule 
10b-5 liability, particularly in the context of communications between 
corporate executives and securities analysts. In the Court’s view: 
Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because a person 
knowingly receives material nonpublic information from an 
 
corporate insider,’ they must either publicly disclose that information or refrain from 
trading”). 
 279. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 667. 
 280. Id. at 666–67.  
 281. Id. at 667 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 
445 U.S. 222, 230 n.12 (1980)).  
 282. Id. at 667 n.27.  
 283. Id. at 676 n.13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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insider and trades on it could have an inhibiting influence on 
the role of market analysts, which the SEC itself recognizes is 
necessary to the preservation of a healthy market. It is 
commonplace for analysts to “ferret out and analyze 
information,” and this often is done by meeting with and 
questioning corporate officers and others who are insiders. 
And information that the analysts obtain normally may be the 
basis for judgments as to the market worth of a corporation’s 
securities.284  
Rather than focusing on the analyst’s clients and the stock market 
losses they managed to avoid, the Court emphasized the central role 
that Dirks had “played in uncovering the fraud at Equity Funding, and 
that analysts in general can play in revealing information that 
corporations may have reason to withhold from the public.”285 The 
Court further observed that, in the absence of guidance “as to where 
the line is between permissible and impermissible disclosures and uses, 
neither corporate insiders nor analysts can be sure when the line is 
crossed.”286 Thus, while a broader interpretation of the insider trading 
prohibitions arising under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 could have 
been reconciled with the common law, the Court eschewed that 
possibility and defined “illegal tipping” in a way that did not 
disincentivize securities analysts from gathering and analyzing 
nonpublic corporate information that contributed to pricing efficiency.  
There is little doubt that Dirks achieved the Court’s desired effect: 
the decision provided corporate executives and securities analysts with 
a safety net for their tightrope. Corporate executives were routinely 
advised that the “‘personal benefit’ test provide[d] significant insulation 
against liability for selective disclosures of material nonpublic 
information to analysts.”287 And securities analysts were likewise 
counseled that they could trade on any material nonpublic information 
that they uncovered or could advise their clients to trade, “[u]nless the 
analyst is knowingly aiding an insider to benefit from the use of 
information about his company.”288 Of course, for corporate executives 
 
 284. Id. at 658–59 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Raymond L. Dirks, 
Exchange Act Release No. 17,480, 21 SEC Docket 1401, 1406 (Jan. 22, 1981)). 
 285. Id. at 658 n.18.  
 286. Id. at 658 n.17.  
 287. Richard M. Phillips & Gregory T. Nojeim, Disclosures to Securities 
Analysts: The Drafty Exposure of the Open-Door Policy, INSIGHTS, May 1990, at 3, 7. 
 288. Meyer Eisenberg, Dirks v. S.E.C.: Implications for Financial Analysts, in 
THE NEW FACE OF INSIDER TRADING: CHIARELLA, DIRKS, AND BEYOND X, X (ALI-ABA 
Course of Study 1983), quoted in John C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC and the Securities 
Analyst, N.Y. L.J., May 30, 1991, at 5 n.12. 
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as well as analysts, the harbor in Dirks would be safe only if there were 
legitimate reasons for relaying the material nonpublic information that 
had been used for securities trading. But, as many observed, 
disclosures to analysts served a variety of corporate ends, “such as to 
enhance the company’s standing with the investor community or to 
strengthen pre-existing lines of communication.”289 Accordingly, in the 
words of one distinguished scholar, the Court’s “language in Dirks 
once seemed a Magna Charta for securities analysis.”290 
2. THE SEC’S PRE-REGULATION FD ATTEMPTS TO LEVEL THE PLAYING 
FIELD 
In the immediate aftermath of Dirks, SEC officials floated trial 
balloons that questioned the comfort that corporate executives and 
securities analysts could draw from the decision. For example, one 
SEC official, then a branch chief in the Division of Enforcement, called 
attention to “the anomalous and undefined nature of a ‘personal 
benefit.’”291 He then provided a cautionary example: if a securities 
analyst is employed by a financial publication, a corporate executive 
should “consider whether a personal benefit could be alleged based on a 
past article favorable to the insider’s reputation or the potential for such 
an article in the future.”292 He also criticized Dirks for giving short 
shrift to the notions of fairness and market integrity that underlie the 
federal securities laws and for sacrificing small investors “in the 
interest of pricing efficiency.”293 He therefore argued for an expansive 
view of the personal benefit test, which, in his view, would better 
balance the competing policy interests at stake.294  
In 1991, the SEC sought to create a more level playing field for all 
investors through a frontal attack on selective disclosure, with Dirks’ 
reference to a “reputational benefit” as the sword. Its target was a 
corporate executive who was charged with illegal tipping under 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.295 According to the SEC’s complaint, 
Philip Stevens, the CEO of Ultrasystems Corporation, made a series of 
unsolicited calls to certain securities analysts to inform them of lower 
than expected quarterly results prior to an official public 
 
 289. Langevoort, supra note 266, at 1024.  
 290. Coffee, supra note 288, at 6. 
 291. Bruce A. Hiler, Dirks v. SEC—A Study in Cause and Effect, 43 MD. L. 
REV. 292, 314 (1984). 
 292. Id. at 315–16. 
 293. Id. at 297–98, 341.  
 294. Id. at 317–23. 
 295. Phillip J. Stevens, Litigation Release No. 12,813, 48 SEC Docket 739, 
739 (Mar. 19, 1991). 
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announcement.296 Two of the analysts shared these new quarterly 
figures with their clients and those clients sold their holdings in 
Ultrasystems, thereby avoiding substantial losses.297 The SEC argued 
that Stevens’ motivation in making his disclosure was “to protect and 
enhance his reputation.”298 The case was settled and thus the SEC’s 
position was never tested in court.299 
The reaction to the Stevens case was predictable. Advocates for 
individual investors hailed it as an important victory,300 but publicly 
traded companies, along with the securities industry, were startled by 
the defeat.301 Corporate and securities lawyers were likewise surprised 
by the settlement, with many criticizing the SEC for “gutting” Dirks.302 
The scholarly consensus was that the theory in Stevens “trivialize[d] 
Dirks” and would extend to most communications between corporate 
executives and securities analysts.303 As Professor John Coffee saw it, 
“to the extent that any ‘reputational benefit’ resulted from Stevens’ 
 
 296. Id. 
 297. Id. at 740. 
 298. Id. at 739. 
 299. Pursuant to the terms of the settlement, Stevens consented to the entry of a 
permanent injunction and agreed to pay approximately $126,500 (the sum total of the 
monetary losses that had been avoided by the analyst’s clients who sold their stock in 
Ultrasystems prior to the company’s public announcement). Id. In Professor Coffee’s 
view, the Stevens case “shows a defendant unwilling to fight even when it had a 
substantial prospect for a litigated victory.” Coffee, supra note 288, at 6. 
 300. See, e.g., Dean Foust, Commentary, The Do’s and Don’ts of Feeding 
Wall Street Analysts, BUS. WK., Apr. 8, 1991, at 27, 27 (critiquing the Stevens 
settlement and concluding that “[i]n an era in which small investors feel handicapped 
when competing against well-connected institutional traders, the SEC in this case is 
right on the money”), cited in Bruce A. Hiler, The SEC and the Insider/Tipper, N.Y. 
L.J., Aug. 29, 1991, at 5, 5. 
 301. See, e.g., Carl W. Schneider, Fencing on the Electrified Tightrope: 
Shocking Executives Who Value Reputation, INSIGHTS, July 1991, at 2, 14 (observing 
that a “simple desire by the executive to do his or her job effectively and well was not 
normally considered to [constitute] an improper purpose”). 
 302. See Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, Issuer Communications with 
Analysts, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 22, 1991, at 5, 6 (bemoaning that the SEC’s overly broad 
interpretation of the reputational benefit prong “could make that element of proof 
meaningless”); Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, For the Issuer, It’s 
Sometimes Tempting to Provide Analysts with Non-Public Information. But Selective 
Disclosures Can Be Perilous, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 18, 1994, at B4, B6 (contending that 
the SEC’s case “was built on a dubious theory,” but speculating that the defendant 
likely settled rather than “wait for such vindication”); Schneider, supra note 301, at 14 
(arguing that “by adroit pleading, the Commission, which lost Dirks, can proceed as 
though it had won, gutting the principle that the case generally was thought to have 
established”). 
 303. Coffee, supra note 288, at 5; see also Merritt B. Fox, Regulation FD and 
Foreign Issuers: Globalization’s Strains and Opportunities, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 653, 662 
(2001) (discussing reactions to the Stevens settlement). 
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conduct, it accrued to Ultrasystems and all of its shareholders 
proportionately, and thus should not amount to a ‘personal gain’ for 
purposes of Dirks.”304 He and others further emphasized the substantial 
chilling effect that Stevens’ reputational benefit theory was likely to 
have on issuer communications with securities analysts.305  
The SEC appeared to take these concerns to heart. Although after 
Stevens, SEC officials continued to warn corporate executives and 
securities analysts about the perils of selective disclosure, the agency 
did not initiate subsequent Rule 10b-5 litigation based on a reputational 
benefit theory.306 Nor did the SEC seek to redefine a corporate 
executive’s selective disclosure to a securities analyst as an illegal tip 
under the misappropriation theory. Such an attempt would have been 
futile because, as previously explained, the crux of the 
misappropriation theory is an agent’s undisclosed personal gain from 
the use of his principal’s information.307  
The SEC did, however, continue to categorize selective disclosure 
as an “increasingly worrisome form of trading on the basis of 
non-public information.”308 In addition to its concerns about diminished 
investor confidence in securities markets, the SEC feared that corporate 
executives were withholding important information from the public so 
that they could curry favor with particular analysts or investors.309 As 
market volatility increased toward the end of the 1990s, the media 
began to highlight specific incidents of unfair selective disclosure and 
“[t]he problem took on increased urgency.”310 In a series of town hall 
meetings across the country, Chairman Levitt vowed to make 
 
 304. Coffee, supra note 288, at 6.  
 305. See id.; Theodore A Levine & W. Hardy Callcott, SEC Examines 
Relationship between Issuers and Analysts, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 7, 1992, at 7, 8 (arguing 
that under the SEC’s rationale, “any corporate executive who ever reveals non-public 
information to an analyst risks insider trading liability . . . because the SEC will always 
be able to allege that the executive made the tip for the purpose of enhancing his or her 
reputation”). 
 306. See Fisch & Sale, supra note 31, at 1061 (observing that after the widely 
criticized Stevens settlement, “the SEC stopped bringing selective disclosure actions 
based on Section 10(b)”); Fox, supra note 303, at 662 (“Research does not reveal any 
subsequent case in which the SEC tried to utilize this theory again to pursue anyone 
either engaging in selective disclosure or acting on it.”).  
 307. See supra text accompanying notes 182–188. But see Wang, supra note 
31, at 871–74 (acknowledging the “conventional wisdom” that selective disclosure is 
seldom illegal, but theorizing that the issuer itself could incur classical theory liability if 
the issuer, “as an entity, [obtains] reciprocal benefits by tipping analysts”).  
 308. Levitt, supra note 267.  
 309. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 
42,259, [1999–2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,228, at 82,848 
(Dec. 20, 1999). 
 310. Fisch & Sale, supra note 31, at 1061–62.  
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eradicating selective disclosure a top priority. His frustration was 
palpable: “Legally, you can split hairs all you want. But, ethically, it’s 
very clear: If analysts or their firms are trading—knowing this 
information, and prior to public release—it’s just as wrong as if 
corporate insiders did it.”311  
Privileging certain investors with material nonpublic information 
may well have been “wrong, plain and simple.”312 But selectively 
disclosing that information, or trading on that information, was seldom 
illegal, “plain and simple.” Unwilling to risk litigation losses based on 
the nebulous theory of a reputational benefit and concerned about that 
strategy’s chilling effect even if were courts were to uphold it,313 the 
SEC had to look beyond the federal insider trading prohibition in order 
to level the playing field for all securities investors. 
B. Regulation FD 
In December 1999, when the SEC proposed its initial version of 
Regulation FD, Chairman Levitt made good on his promise to end the 
routine practice of selective disclosure in the private sector.314 Although 
predicated on the belief that “all investors should have access to an 
issuer’s material disclosures at the same time,”315 the proposed 
regulation did not proscribe selective disclosure as a “deceptive device 
or contrivance” under Section 10(b).316 Instead, it was made pursuant to 
the SEC’s authority under Exchange Act Section 13(a),317 which 
empowers the agency to mandate ongoing disclosure by publicly traded 
 
 311. Levitt, supra note 267.  
 312. LEVITT, supra note 32, at 87. 
 313. See Panel Discussion: The SEC’s Regulation FD, 6 FORDHAM J. CORP. & 
FIN. L. 273, 279 (2001) (statement by former SEC Commissioner and General Counsel 
Harvey Goldschmid) (contending that the agency could have won “the 
extension-of-Dirks case at the Supreme Court . . . [but] there would or might be a 
heavy price to pay for doing so”). 
 314. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 
42,259, [1999–2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,228, at 82,846 
(Dec. 20, 1999). Much of the background in this Section is based on the more extensive 
discussion in RALPH C. FERRARA, DONNA M. NAGY & HERBERT THOMAS, FERRARA ON 
INSIDER TRADING AND THE WALL § 7.08[3] (2012).  
 315. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 
42,259, [1999–2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,228, at 82,847 
(Dec. 20, 1999). But see Choi, supra note 31, at 564 (observing that Regulation FD 
also acts “as a preventive device to protect against possible opportunistic uses of 
selective disclosures where determination of whether managers are acting 
opportunistically is difficult”). 
 316. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
 317. § 78m(a). 
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companies.318 After a lengthy period of notice and comment, Regulation 
FD was revised and adopted in August 2000, with an effective date of 
October 15, 2000.319 It reflects a clear policy decision to regulate 
issuers and their disclosures rather than securities investors and their 
trading.  
Rule 100 of Regulation FD sets forth a “general rule regarding 
selective disclosure.”320 As summarized in the SEC’s adopting release, 
the rule requires that whenever: 
(1) an issuer, or person acting on its behalf, 
(2) discloses material nonpublic information, 
(3) to certain enumerated persons (in general, securities 
market professionals or holders of the issuer’s securities who 
may well trade on the basis of the information), 
(4) the issuer must make public disclosure of that same 
information  
 (a) simultaneously (for intentional disclosures), or 
 (b) promptly (for nonintentional disclosures).321 
Accordingly, although Regulation FD does not automatically require a 
publicly traded company to promptly disclose all material events as they 
occur, it does in fact require that when a company chooses to disclose 
material nonpublic information to a person covered by the regulation, 
“it must do so in a manner that provides general public disclosure, 
rather than through a selective disclosure” to a favored few.322 
Regulation FD, as adopted, differs in at least two principal 
respects from the version originally proposed.323 First, in the final 
 
 318. In addition to issuers with a class of securities registered under Exchange 
Act Section 12, Regulation FD applies to issuers required to file reports under 
Exchange Act Section 15(d) and to closed-end investment companies, but it does not 
apply to any other investment companies or any foreign government or foreign private 
issuer. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(b) (2012). 
 319. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 
43,154, [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,319, at 83,676 (Aug. 
15, 2000).  
 320. § 243.100.  
 321. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 
43,154, [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,319, at 83,680–81 
(Aug. 15, 2000). 
 322. Id. at 83,681; see Robert B. Thompson & Ronald King, Credibility and 
Information in Securities Markets after Regulation FD, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 615, 615 
(2001) (emphasizing that under Regulation FD “companies now face an all or nothing 
choice: they are not required to disclose any more information than before, but if they 
tell someone, they must tell everyone”). 
 323. In its adopting release, the SEC highlighted the “outpouring of public 
comment” that was triggered in response to its proposal to add Regulation FD to the 
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version of the regulation, the SEC sought to narrow the scope by 
regulating only those communications from an issuer to one of four 
specifically enumerated categories of persons and associated persons: 
(1) broker-dealers, (2) investment advisers or institutional investment 
managers, (3) investment companies or hedge funds, and (4) holders of 
the issuer’s securities, “under circumstances in which it is reasonably 
foreseeable that the person will purchase or sell the issuer’s securities 
on the basis of the information.”324 The initial proposal did not contain 
this limitation, applying instead to all communications with persons 
outside the issuer.325 In its adopting release, the SEC acknowledged that 
an application to all communications might “inappropriately interfere 
with ordinary-course business communications with parties such as 
customers, suppliers, strategic partners, and government regulators” 
and might also inhibit communications with the media.326 Second, to 
further ensure the free flow of ordinary-course business 
communications, the SEC restricted the types of issuer personnel who 
are covered by the regulation to only senior officials or other persons 
who “regularly communicate with securities market professionals or 
security holders.”327  
Regulation FD also explicitly exempts communications to “a 
person who owes a duty of trust or confidence to the issuer (such as an 
attorney, investment banker, or accountant),”328 as well as to other 
persons who “expressly agree[] to maintain the disclosed information in 
confidence.”329 These exemptions thus recognize that issuers and their 
officials may continue to share material nonpublic information with 
outsiders for legitimate business reasons, but that any trading (or 
tipping) based on that information would subject the recipient to Rule 
 
federal securities laws. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act 
Release No. 43,154, [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,319, at 
83,677–78 (Aug. 15, 2000) (observing receipt of nearly 6000 comment letters, the vast 
majority of which were from individual investors urging adoption of the regulation).  
 324. § 243.100(b)(1)(i). 
 325. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 
43,154, [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,319, at 83,680 (Aug. 
15, 2000). 
 326. Id. at 83,681  
 327. Id. at 83,680.  
 328. § 243.100(a)(2)(i). 
 329. § 243.100(a)(2)(ii). The SEC has made clear that while an agreement to 
maintain confidentiality must be express, the agreement need not be a written one—“an 
express oral agreement will suffice.” Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 
Exchange Act Release No. 43,154, [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
¶ 86,319, at 83,682 n.28 (Aug. 15, 2000). Moreover, agreements entered into after the 
disclosure is made, but before the information’s recipient discloses or trades on the 
basis of it, are sufficient as well. Id. 
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10b-5 liability as a “temporary insider” of the issuer under the classical 
theory of insider trading330 or pursuant to the misappropriation 
theory.331 Here it is important to recognize that on the same day it 
adopted Regulation FD, the SEC also adopted SEC Rule 10b5-2, a new 
insider trading rule setting forth three nonexclusive circumstances under 
which a person can be deemed to have a duty of trust or confidence for 
purposes of the misappropriation theory.332 One of those circumstances 
imposes a duty “[w]henever a person agrees to maintain information in 
confidence.”333 Yet, notwithstanding the plain text of Rule 
10b5-2(b)(1), at least one court has held that mere confidentiality 
agreements, absent an explicit or implicit promise not to use 
confidential information in one’s own securities trading, cannot create a 
duty sufficient to support Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liability under 
the misappropriation theory.334  
The many definitional provisions set out in Regulation FD provide 
additional clarification with respect to the scope and effect of the 
general rule. For example, Rule 101(a) defines the selective disclosure 
of material nonpublic information as “intentional” when “the person 
making the disclosure either knows, or was reckless in not knowing, 
that the information he or she is communicating is both material and 
nonpublic.”335 When such intentional disclosures occur, the issuer is 
required to publicly disclose the same information “simultaneously.”336 
The clear intent behind the SEC’s “simultaneous” disclosure 
requirement is to prohibit senior company officials from intentionally 
making selective disclosures to those persons who are most likely to 
trade on that information. Rule 101(d) then states that when a corporate 
official makes a “non-intentional disclosure” of material nonpublic 
 
 330. See supra note 150 (discussing Dirks’ extension of the classical theory to 
temporary insiders). 
 331. See supra text accompanying note 138.  
 332. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 
43,154, [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,319, at 83,696–97 
(Aug. 15, 2000). 
 333. § 240.10b5-2(b)(1).  
 334. SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 728 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (holding that 
the defendant’s alleged trading on information subject to a confidentiality agreement 
would not have been deceptive under Section 10(b) unless the SEC could also show that 
defendant “agreed, expressly or implicitly, to refrain from trading on or otherwise 
using for his own benefit the information the CEO was about to share”), vacated and 
remanded on other grounds, 620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 335. § 243.101(a). 
 336. § 243.100(a)(1). 
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information,337 the issuer must make public disclosure of that 
information “promptly.”338  
Regulation FD also provides an issuer with a significant degree of 
choice as to how to make the requisite “public disclosures.” One option 
would be for the issuer to make the disclosure by filing a Form 8-K 
with the SEC.339 Alternatively, the issuer could “disseminate[] the 
information through another method (or combination of methods) of 
disclosure that is reasonably designed to provide broad, 
nonexclusionary distribution of the information to the public.”340 Thus, 
an issuer could accomplish the public disclosure through an 
announcement at a press conference or in a conference call, provided 
that the public is given “adequate notice” of the conference or call and 
the means for accessing it.341 The adopting release further emphasized 
that “[t]he regulation does not require use of a particular method, or 
establish a ‘one size fits all’ standard for disclosure.”342 Instead, the 
SEC opted to “leave[] the decision to the issuer to choose methods that 
are reasonably calculated to make effective, broad, and nonexclusionary 
public disclosure, given the particular circumstances of that issuer.”343 
In 2008, the SEC issued a new release providing issuers with much 
needed guidance as to when information posted on a website could be 
deemed publicly available within the meaning of Regulation FD.344 
 
 337. For instance, a disclosure would be “non-intentional” if a corporate 
official were to disclose confidential information “inadvertently through an honest slip 
of the tongue” or if the official mistakenly (but not recklessly) believed that the 
information was not material or had already been made public. See Selective Disclosure 
and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 42,259, [1999–2000 Transfer Binder] 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,228, at 82,853 (Dec. 20, 1999). 
 338. § 243.101(d). The term “promptly” is defined to mean: 
[A]s soon as reasonably practicable (but in no event after the later of 24 
hours or the commencement of the next day’s trading on the New York 
Stock Exchange) after a senior official of the issuer . . . learns that there 
has been a non-intentional disclosure by the issuer or person acting on 
behalf of the issuer of information that the senior official knows, or is 
reckless in not knowing, is both material and nonpublic.  
Id. 
 339. See § 243.101(e)(1). 
 340. § 243.101(e)(2). 
 341. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 
43,154, [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,319, at 83,687 (Aug. 
15, 2000). 
 342. Id. 
 343. Id. 
 344. See Commission Guidance on the Use of Company Web Sites, Exchange 
Act Release No. 34-58288, 2008 WL 4068202, at *9 (Aug. 1, 2008) [hereinafter SEC 
Guidance on Corporate Web Sites]. The release emphasized consideration of three 
factors: (1) whether a company’s website is “a recognized channel of distribution,” (2) 
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Absent from Regulation FD is any attempt to define “material” 
information. Rather, the SEC opted to rely on the existing definitions 
“established in the case law.”345 Although it recognized that 
“materiality judgments can be difficult,”346 the SEC decided against 
“set[ting] forth a bright-line test, or an exclusive list of ‘material’ items 
for purposes of Regulation FD.”347 The adopting release did, however, 
make clear that nothing in Regulation FD would prohibit an issuer from 
sharing “a non-material piece of information [with a securities] analyst, 
even if, unbeknownst to the issuer, that piece helps the analyst complete 
a ‘mosaic’ of information that, taken together, is material.”348 The SEC 
also emphasized that since materiality is an objective standard turning 
on the decision-making of a reasonable investor, “Regulation FD will 
not be implicated where an issuer discloses immaterial information 
whose significance is discerned by the analyst.”349 
C. Evaluating Regulation FD a Decade Later 
From the time Regulation FD was first considered, the possibility 
that it might chill corporate disclosures to analysts, investors, and the 
media was considered its principal cost. Indeed, commentators feared 
that it might cause issuers to speak less frequently and with a greater 
degree of abstraction, because corporate officials would fear a post hoc 
judicial or administrative determination that the disclosed information 
was material.350 And in the immediate aftermath of Regulation FD’s 
adoption, evaluations and feedback from both corporate issuers and 
securities analysts indicated that a chilling effect might have 
occurred.351 Much of the commentary that followed a year or two later, 
 
whether website posting disseminates information in a manner that makes it generally 
available to the securities market, and (3) whether there has been “a reasonable waiting 
period for investors and the market to react to the posted information.” Id. at *6.  
 345. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 
43,154, [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,319, at 83,683 (Aug. 
15, 2000). 
 346. Id. at 83,684. 
 347. Id. 
 348. Id. at 83,684–85. 
 349. Id. at 83,685. 
 350. See id. at 83,701 (citing comment letters from the Securities Industry 
Association, the Bond Market Association, and the American Bar Association).  
 351. See, e.g., Industry Participants Want SEC to Issue Guidance on 
Regulation FD, 33 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at 637 (Apr. 30, 2001) (“The 
analyst community has been particularly vocal in its opposition to the rule, claiming 
that issuers have clammed up, often unnecessarily, because of ambiguity surrounding 
Regulation FD.”); Most Companies Seeking to Comply with Reg FD Disclosure 
Requirements, 33 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 586 (Apr. 23, 2001) (noting 
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however, “suggest[ed] that the purported negative effects of Regulation 
FD on information flow and volatility may be overstated.”352 Instead, 
many issuers quickly adapted their disclosure practices in a manner that 
increased the general public’s access to corporate information.353 For 
example, in the year following Regulation FD’s adoption, issuer use of 
webcasts quadrupled, which provided the public with access to earnings 
conference calls and in-person meetings with analysts.354 Some issuers 
also argued that Regulation FD abridges commercial speech protected 
by the First Amendment.355 But the SEC has defended the regulation as 
an appropriate time, place, and manner regulation of commercial 
activity that mandates speech only when information has been 
previously or simultaneously disclosed to regulated professionals or 
holders of the issuer’s securities who are likely to trade.356 
Today, more than a decade after Regulation FD’s adoption, SEC 
officials continue to laud the regulation as a tremendous success.357 
While that self-evaluation is hardly surprising, even organizations that 
often function as the SEC’s nemesis have offered a positive evaluation. 
 
that “[t]he regulation has been controversial in some circles, with groups contending it 
has hampered the release of information important to investors,” and that “[i]ssuers, in 
some cases, have complained that compliance with the regulation is too complex and 
uncertain”).  
 352. Fisch & Sale, supra note 31, at 1066–68 (discussing empirical research in 
the immediate aftermath of Regulation FD); see also Robert J. Conner, Regulation FD: 
Its Creation, Its Authority, Its Possible Impact, 28 SEC. REG. L.J. 233, 263 (2000) 
(contending that “issuers’ fears may not be as real as they appear”).  
 353. See Jill E. Fisch, Regulation FD: An Alternative Approach to Addressing 
Information Asymmetry, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INSIDER TRADING (Stephen 
Bainbridge ed.) (forthcoming 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2042696.  
 354. See Aaron J. VanGetson, Note, Real-Time Disclosure of Securities 
Information via the Internet: Real Time or Not Right Now?, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & 
POL’Y 551, 565 (citing LAURA S. UNGER, SEC, SPECIAL STUDY: REGULATION FAIR 
DISCLOSURE REVISITED (2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/ 
regfdstudy.htm). 
 355. See Antony Page & Katy Yang, Controlling Corporate Speech: Is 
Regulation Fair Disclosure Unconstitutional?, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 47–60 (2005). 
 356. The SEC has initiated a dozen or so enforcement actions charging 
securities issuers and/or their corporate executives with violations of Regulation FD. 
See FERRARA, NAGY & THOMAS, supra note 314, at § 7.08[3][b] (discussing Regulation 
FD proceedings). In the only Reg FD proceeding that was litigated rather than settled, 
the court held that the allegations in the SEC’s complaint did not support its claim that 
the defendants had privately disclosed material nonpublic information. SEC v. Siebel 
Systems, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 2d 694, 710 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Having granted the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint, the court “decline[d] to opine on the 
constitutional challenges raised.” Id. at 709 n.16. 
 357. See, e.g., LEVITT, supra note 32, at 89 (“I now believe Reg FD has done 
more to restore investor confidence in the stock market than any other rule the SEC 
adopted during my tenure [as Chairman].”). 
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For instance, the Business Roundtable, which is comprised of the CEOs 
of 160 leading corporations,358 wrote to then-SEC Chairman William 
Donaldson in 2005: We “believe[] that Regulation FD has been 
successful in accomplishing the Commission’s goal of promoting full 
and fair disclosure. We also believe Regulation FD has had the 
important and beneficial effect of enhancing investor confidence in the 
marketplace. For these reasons . . . [we] continue[] to support 
Regulation FD.”359 Finance scholars have also been carefully tracking 
Regulation FD’s operations, though, as Professor Jill Fisch has recently 
summarized, the mixed results of the extensive empirical research make 
it difficult to reach definitive assessments.360 She observes, however, 
that “[t]here is substantial evidence that Regulation FD reduced 
selective disclosure and information asymmetries” and that these 
reductions in asymmetries have a beneficial effect to the market.361 On 
the other hand, “[a]t least some studies have found reduced overall 
disclosure, especially by smaller firms.”362 Yet she draws one 
conclusion that is equally relevant to the practice of selective disclosure 
by federal officials: “the disclosure-based structure of Regulation FD 
appears better suited to balancing competing policy considerations in 
this area than the blunt force of antifraud liability.”363  
III. AN FGD REGIME FOR THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
In the private sector, the SEC was able to curtail unfair selective 
disclosure only when it shifted its attention away from securities 
analysts and what they did with the information they gathered, and 
focused instead on securities issuers and the ways in which corporate 
executives were disseminating material nonpublic information. Given 
the rare bipartisanship and rapid momentum that led to the passage of 
the STOCK Act,364 now is an opportune time to address the federal 
government’s own problem with selective disclosure.  
 
 358. Stephen M. Cutler, Dir. Div. of Enforcement, SEC, Remarks before the 
Directors’ Education Institute at Duke University: Staying the Course (Mar. 18, 2005), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch031805smc.htm. 
 359. Id. (quoting a letter from Business Roundtable to William Donaldson, 
SEC Chairman). 
 360. Fisch, supra note 353, at 18–19.  
 361. Id. at 19 (citing sources including William J. Kross & Inho Suk, Does 
Regulation FD Work? Evidence from Analysts’ Reliance on Public Disclosure, 53 J. 
ACCT. & ECON. 225 (2012); and Praveen Sinha & Christopher Gadarowski, The 
Efficacy of Regulation Fair Disclosure, 45 FIN. REV. 331 (2010)).  
 362. Id. (citing Edward R. Lawrence et al., Effect of Regulation FD on 
Disclosures of Information by Firms, 21 APPLIED FIN. ECON. 979 (2011)).  
 363. Id. at 24.  
 364. See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text.  
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This final Part of this Article sets out a framework designed to 
enhance the internal controls on federal officials who may interact with 
securities investors or consultants seeking to profit from political 
intelligence. We first discuss generally some of the challenges that 
likely will arise in designing an FGD regime. We then suggest seven 
possible measures for achieving fairer government disclosure. We 
intend to build on these FGD measures with more specific proposals in 
a subsequent article. Here, however, we begin the conversation by 
suggesting immediate steps that federal officials could take either 
individually or through directives issued by agency heads and 
congressional committees.  
A. Challenges for Developing an FGD Regime  
The development of an FGD regime for federal officials implicates 
several unique challenges that the SEC did not have to tackle in 
designing Regulation FD for publicly traded corporations and their 
executives. But these challenges should not impede a commitment to 
eliminating—or at least curtailing—the unfair selective disclosures that 
have been a tradition in the federal government for far too long.365  
First, those working toward fairer government disclosure would 
have to recognize that a broad range of individuals and entities expect 
prompt disclosure of nonpublic government information that affects 
them directly. If the government does not wish to release such 
information to the general public (or wishes to delay the release),366 
these affected persons expect, and in many instances deserve, selective 
disclosure. But individuals and entities lacking any intention to trade 
securities may inadvertently function as conduits for others who are 
seeking to gain an informational edge. For instance, a hedge fund 
trader deciding whether to short the stock of for-profit colleges could 
possibly gather nonpublic DOE information from community college 
officials who are eager to learn what the DOE is planning to do about 
alleged abuses by their for-profit competitors.367 The quest to deny an 
 
 365. See supra Part I.A. Although we have little doubt that selective disclosure 
of market-moving government information is a problem at the state and local level as 
well, our attention is focused on the federal government. Many of our ideas and 
suggestions, however, would be appropriate for state and local governments as well.  
 366. Professor Cass Sunstein identified five justifications often invoked by the 
government for suppressing, or delaying, its release of information: protecting military 
plans, facilitating negotiations, facilitating uninhibited deliberations within the 
government, avoiding interest-group pressures, and avoiding distrust and suspicion, 
encouraging communications from others. Cass R. Sunstein, Government Control of 
Information, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 889, 895–96 (1986).  
 367. Cf. supra notes 103–106 and accompanying text.  
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informational edge to some securities investors should not diminish the 
flow of government information to those individuals and entities that 
need nonpublic information to organize interests and activities that have 
nothing at all to do with investments in securities markets.  
Moreover, as we have seen, securities investors will often acquire 
selectively disclosed government information while they are also 
seeking to influence government decision making.368 Whereas corporate 
managers generally are not expected to be in constant communication 
with persons trying to influence corporate conduct and decision 
making, federal officials—particularly elected officials—are expected to 
communicate with a host of different constituencies. Keeping their jobs 
may depend upon how well these officials communicate information, to 
whom, and how quickly. The right to petition the government for 
redress of grievances is not only constitutionally protected,369 it has 
become a multi-billion dollar business,370 and lobbying activity is often 
interwoven with political intelligence gathering.  
An FGD regime would likewise have to address the very frequent 
communications that federal officials have with the media, which 
nowadays includes Internet sites, Twitter, subscription services, and 
other outlets in addition to traditional newspapers, radio, and television. 
Indeed, a political intelligence consultant may be able to attend a 
government press briefing as a journalist of sorts, and even some 
journalists from mainstream media organizations fall into a gray area 
because their newsletters offer specialized subscriptions to investment 
professionals.371 With Regulation FD, however, the SEC did not have 
to contend with this challenge because the regulation restricts the 
disclosure of material nonpublic information only when certain 
corporate executives communicate with regulated market professionals 
or holders of the issuer’s securities who are likely to trade.372  
 
 368. See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text (discussing the lobbying 
that occurred in 1789 with respect to the payment of Revolutionary War debts); supra 
notes 103–106 and accompanying text (discussing a well-known hedge fund manager 
and his communications with the Department of Education).  
 369. Nicholas W. Allard, Lobbying Is an Honorable Profession: The Right to 
 369. See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text (discussing the lobbying 
that occurred in 1789 with respect to the payment of Revolutionary War debts); supra 
notes 103–106 and accompanying text (discussing a well-known hedge fund manager 
and his communications with the Department of Education).  
Petition and the Competition to Be Right, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 36–42 (2008) 
(discussing constitutional dimensions of public policy advocacy).  
 370. Id. at 49–50. 
 371. See infra Part III.B.6. 
 372. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(1)(i) to (iv) (2012); see also supra text 
accompanying note 324.  
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Finally, an FGD regime would have to recognize that federal 
officials often make selective disclosures of market-moving information 
to individuals and entities from whom the government is seeking 
cooperation, information, and guidance.373 Moreover, in crisis 
situations such as wartime, acts of terrorism, or economic collapse, 
such “necessary” selective disclosure must often be undertaken quickly, 
informally, and on a relatively broad scale. The Department of 
Homeland Security, for instance, might selectively disclose to airlines 
information about a major security threat that, unless resolved quickly, 
is likely to shut down air traffic for a prolonged period of time. 
Another example of necessary selective disclosure occurred in 
September 2008, when officials from the Treasury Department, the 
SEC, and the Federal Reserve met with Wall Street executives in an 
attempt to resolve the financial crisis.374 Indeed, market-moving 
information about the government’s decision to allow Lehman Brothers 
to fail was disclosed selectively to some on Wall Street in the days 
preceding the firm’s bankruptcy filing on Monday, September 15, 
2008,375 and perhaps even in the months preceding Lehman’s failure. 
Yet some of this necessary selective disclosure may have occurred 
contemporaneously with other types of selective disclosure, such as the 
Secretary of the Treasury’s reported briefings to hedge funds and 
investment bankers about the government’s planned response to the 
situation at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.376 
Although legitimate, good faith disclosures of material nonpublic 
government information to securities investors are frequently necessary 
and appropriate, federal officials often appear to make selective 
disclosures in the absence of any formal policy addressing, among other 
issues: (1) when federal officials may disclose market-moving 
information selectively and to whom, (2) when and how a public 
announcement of that information will be made, and (3) whether federal 
officials will procure an agreement from the information’s recipients to 
maintain confidentiality and not to use that information for securities 
trading purposes. An FGD regime could help sort out the necessary 
selective disclosures from the unnecessary and could establish better 
 
 373. See Mullins & Pulliam, supra note 15 (citing statements by lawmakers as 
to the value of feedback from hedge funds and other investors). 
 374. See Public Policy Issues Raised by the Report of the Lehman Bankruptcy 
Examiner: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 179 (2010) 
(statement of Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC) (“Over the weekend of September 
12th - 14th, representatives from the Treasury, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
and the Commission met with management from Lehman and other major financial 
firms in an effort to address the situation.”).  
 375. Id.  
 376. See supra notes 83–87 and accompanying text.  
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procedures and protocols for how necessary selective disclosure will be 
conducted. On the other hand, an FGD regime will have to give the 
government flexibility in many situations and even more flexibility in 
crisis situations.  
B. Possible Measures for Fairer Government Disclosure  
We sketch out below seven distinct measures that federal officials 
could adopt to create a more level playing field for all securities 
investors. None of these measures, even taken together, would amount 
to a Reg FD-like all-or-nothing prohibition of selective disclosure. 
Indeed, for a host of reasons including those set out above, an FGD 
regime obligating all federal officials in all three branches of the 
government to simultaneously disclose material nonpublic information 
to all securities investors simply could not be reconciled with the size 
and complexities of our federal government. Without a bevy of 
exceptions (which could perhaps swallow the general rule), the end 
result would be a triple whammy: a reduced flow of information out of 
the government, a less informed populace, and less efficient securities 
markets. In contrast, adherence to FGD measures along the lines we 
describe could go a long way toward increasing the flow of government 
information for everyone, while decreasing the investment edges that 
have long enabled privileged investors to beat out ordinary 
citizen-investors. Thus, an FGD regime could boost confidence not 
only in the integrity of securities markets but also in the integrity of the 
federal government itself.  
1. PRESENT THE CASE FOR FGD TO THE PUBLIC 
As an initial and important step, the President could announce 
fairer government disclosure as a major policy initiative. He could 
begin by acknowledging, in general terms, some of the unfair selective 
disclosures that have occurred in the past, and he could pledge to make 
more equal access to market-moving government information a top 
administrative priority.377 The President could then instruct all 
executive agencies and departments to review their internal controls for 
interactions with persons outside the government likely to be seeking 
information for personal profit in securities markets and he could 
 
 377. President Obama took a similar step when he endorsed the STOCK Act in 
his 2012 State of the Union Address and suggested new legislation that would prohibit 
“any elected official from owning stocks in industries they impact.” See supra note 23 
and accompanying text.  
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encourage congressional officials to do the same.378 He could also call 
upon public interest groups, academics, and thinktanks—from both 
sides of the political spectrum—to weigh in on proposed measures for 
fairer government disclosure, much as organizations have already 
begun to do in the debate over whether and how to regulate political 
intelligence activity.379 Finally, the President could quote SEC 
Chairman Arthur Levitt as an effective reminder to all federal officials, 
including members of Congress, that our democracy “has no tolerance 
for favoritism,” that it “holds no place for privilege,” and that 
“[w]ell-connected people don’t deserve any greater chance for success 
[in securities markets] than the average citizen.”380 This appeal to 
integrity would produce a two-fold benefit: it would encourage federal 
officials to consider more thoughtfully the selective disclosures they 
make and it would engender the same type of populist support that the 
SEC drew at town hall meetings across the country prior to the 
adoption of Regulation FD.381  
 
 378. As a more ambitious undertaking, the President could encourage Congress 
to begin to explore the possibility of legislation that would make real-time public 
disclosure of market-moving information more of a norm. Cf. OMB WATCH, MOVING 
TOWARD A 21ST CENTURY RIGHT-TO-KNOW AGENDA: RECOMMENDATIONS TO 
PRESIDENT-ELECT OBAMA AND CONGRESS 1–2 (2008), http://www.ombwatch.org/node/ 
11612 (advocating for “a government where . . . federal agencies proactively 
disseminate information to the public in timely, easy-to-find, and searchable formats” 
and calling upon President Obama and Congress to “act decisively to achieve this 
vision”). Existing statutes—such as the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 
(2006), which requires federal agencies to disclose their records upon request (subject 
to exceptions), § 552, and the Government in the Sunshine Act, § 552b, which requires 
every portion of every meeting of federal agencies to be open to the public (subject to 
exceptions), § 552b—would provide a rough model of what such an omnibus real-time 
disclosure statute could look like.   
 379. Compare Blair, supra note 250, at 16 (stating that “Public Citizen will 
push lawmakers to support . . . legislative efforts” to regulate political intelligence 
gathering and “will continue to fight to ensure that Wall Street can no longer secretly 
troll the halls of Congress for privileged information to prop up its profiteering 
schemes”), with John Berlau & David Bier, The Problems with the STOCK Act, NAT’L 
REV. ONLINE (Feb. 14, 2012, 4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/ 
articles/290847/problems-stock-act-john-berlau (contending that proposed efforts to 
regulate political intelligence threaten First Amendment values and “would muzzle the 
communication necessary for sunlight and reform”).  
 380. See supra note 267 and accompanying text (quoting then-SEC Chairman 
Arthur Levitt).  
 381. See id.; see also text accompanying supra note 311. On his first day in 
office, President Obama ordered the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to issue 
an open government directive requiring federal agencies to take specific steps toward 
greater transparency, participation, and collaboration. See Memorandum on 
Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685, 4685 (Jan. 26, 2009). But 
neither that OMB directive, nor any of the open government initiatives that followed, 
have been tailored specifically toward preventing the type of informational edge that 
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2. ASSESS CURRENT PROCEDURES AND PROTOCOLS  
The set of questions recently posed to the DOE382 and CMS383 can 
serve as a useful template for self-studies that would assess procedures 
and protocols currently in place at executive agencies and congressional 
offices. These questions would prompt each executive agency as well as 
individual members of Congress to describe their policies “for all 
interactions with persons who are not government employees, 
contractors, or subcontractors and seek information for profit [in 
securities markets]” or to explain why the agency or congressional 
office has “not created a policy.”384 With the STOCK Act’s mandated 
GAO study of political intelligence gathering already underway,385 it is 
possible that some self-assessment may already be occurring. 
These self-studies could then be used to inform possible 
rulemaking initiatives by executive agencies and congressional 
committees. Agency rulemaking could offer persons outside the 
government the opportunity to weigh in on an agency’s proposed FGD 
policies and procedures, some of which might allow too much selective 
disclosure, or, conversely, might reduce agency transparency by 
discouraging disclosure. The House and Senate Ethics Committees 
could likewise embody new policies and procedures in House and 
Senate rules binding on all members. FGD rules for agency and 
congressional officials, however, will be effective in altering 
longstanding traditions only insofar as they are enforced. Indeed, 
Regulation FD’s overall success in the private sector derives in large 
part from the SEC’s readiness to initiate enforcement action against 
issuers and corporate executives who violate the rules. But FGD 
compliance would likely be monitored and enforced internally, by the 
particular agency or committee that promulgated the rules. 
Given the strict confidentiality norms observed by federal judges 
and their staffs, selective disclosure of market-moving information is 
not as likely to be a problem in the judicial branch as it is in the other 
 
privilege investors routinely attain from their connections to the inside of government. 
See generally Open Government Initiative, WHITEHOUSE, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/open (last visited Nov. 1, 2012). In contrast, an FGD 
Regime would be specifically aimed at the problem of selective disclosure and would be 
geared toward effective solutions.  
 382. See Grassley DOE Letter, supra note 104. 
 383. See Grassley CMS Letter, supra note 107. 
 384. See Grassley DOE Letter, supra note 104, at 2.  
 385. See supra notes 231–233 and accompanying text.  
1358 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
two branches.386 But the judiciary’s policy-making body, the Judicial 
Conference of the United States, could use this occasion as an 
opportunity to review and refine its confidentiality rules as well as its 
procedures for announcing judicial decisions.  
3. DESIGNATE ONE OR MORE FGD OVERSEERS  
Progress toward fairer government disclosure would also be 
facilitated through the appointment of one or more FGD overseers. In 
the executive branch, for example, an official from the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), a subdivision of the OMB, 
could coordinate with agency heads and disseminate information and 
best practices across agencies.387 In the legislative branch, one or more 
persons could be charged with similar responsibilities in connection 
with individual congressional offices. The Senate Select Committee on 
Ethics and the House Committee on Ethics could, for instance, each 
designate a particular staff counsel to perform this role.  
4. GREATER USE OF THE INTERNET  
Regulation FD prompted publicly traded companies to harness the 
power of the Internet, which now provides the public with routine 
access to earnings conference calls and in-person meetings between 
corporate executives and securities analysts.388 We would hardly 
support an FGD regime in which live webcasts were required for all 
meetings and briefings between federal officials and outside parties. But 
such webcasts might nonetheless be appropriate when senior agency 
officials, or members of Congress and their senior staffs, participate in 
briefings with political intelligence consultants, hedge funds, or other 
investors who are likely to use government information to profit in 
securities markets. An alternative to webcasts would be to post talking 
points memoranda on the executive agency or congressional office 
website, with the agency or office announcing that practice well in 
advance so that its website becomes a “recognized channel of 
 
 386. But see supra note 137 and accompanying text (discussing a leaking 
scandal in 1919 involving a law clerk to United States Supreme Court Justice Joseph 
McKenna).  
 387. OIRA already “oversees the implementation of government-wide policies 
in several areas, including information quality and statistical standards.” About OIRA, 
OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/ 
inforeg_administrator (last visited Nov. 25, 2012).  
 388. See supra note 354 and accompanying text (noting that issuer use of 
webcasts quadrupled in the year following Regulation FD’s adoption).  
2012:1285 Selective Disclosure by Federal Officials 1359 
distribution” for new and important information.389 The principal 
exceptions to the webcast or talking points protocols would involve 
meetings and briefings with persons who have entered into 
confidentiality agreements that include a promise not to use material 
nonpublic information in securities trading,390 or meetings and briefings 
in which agency or congressional officials are confident that material 
nonpublic information will not be traded on or revealed.  
Senior agency officials, as well as members of Congress and their 
senior staffs, could also adopt a general practice of posting on websites 
the time and place of their meetings and the names of attendees outside 
the government. Although the content of the discussion at these 
meetings would not need to be revealed, the disclosure of the meeting 
itself (e.g., “Treasury Secretary meeting with Ms. A from XYZ, Inc.” 
or “Congresswoman B meets with Mr. C”) would provide the public 
with some useful information and would discourage unfair selective 
disclosure of nonpublic information. This idea is hardly a new one: in 
2006, the Sunlight Foundation launched a campaign (dubbed 
“Operation Punch Clock”) to encourage members of Congress to post 
their official daily schedules on the Internet.391 
Lastly, federal agencies and congressional offices could make 
greater use of the Internet by publicly posting material that could reveal 
leanings, deliberations, or decisions that otherwise would be known 
only by the well connected.392 One example of a “best practice” is the 
 
 389. SEC Guidance on Corporate Web Sites, supra note 344, at *6.  
 390. See infra Part III.B.5. Discussion of nonpublic government information at 
certain broad categories of meetings, such as partisan political events and fundraisers, 
could perhaps be prohibited outright. The Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321–26 (2006), 
already requires that executive branch officials attend such events only in their personal 
capacity. So it would be difficult to justify a legitimate, good faith reason for the 
disclosure of nonpublic government information at these events. On the other hand, a 
blanket ban that would prohibit federal officials from disclosing material nonpublic 
government information to certain categories of persons or entities (such as political 
intelligence consultants, hedge funds, or other professional investors) would likely 
trigger constitutional challenges under the Equal Protection Clause or First Amendment 
(and may also implicate protections under the Speech or Debate Clause for 
congressional officials). See supra Part I.B.3.b.  
 391. OpenCongress reports that five Senators and three Representatives 
currently post their schedules online: Senator Max Baucus (D-Mont.), Senator Mark 
Begich (D-Alaska), Senator Kirsten Gillibrand (D-N.Y.), Senator Bill Nelson (D-Fla.), 
Senator Jon Tester (D-Mont.), Representative Kathy Castor (D-Fla.), Representative 
Denny Rehberg (R-Mont.), and Representative John Yarmuth (D-Ky.). Members of 
Congress Posting Schedules Online, OPENCONGRESS, 
http://www.opencongress.org/wiki/Members_of_Congress_posting_schedules_online 
(last visited Nov. 1, 2012).  
 392. See Zagorin, supra note 47 (discussing a proposal from 
OpenTheGovernment.org, a coalition chaired by POGO, “under which federal 
departments would routinely and pro-actively post to the Internet non-exempt 
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Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s recently announced decision to 
post on its website the surveys it sends to major financial firms ahead of 
monetary-policy meetings.393 Because those surveys contain queries that 
“can provide early clues to the Fed’s thinking,” same-day website 
accessibility creates a leveler playing field for ordinary investors who 
previously lacked access to these surveys.394 The following month, the 
Fed announced its own new policy for public disclosure of federal 
funds rate forecasts by its policy committee members.395 Although the 
Fed has reasons to publicly disclose such internal deliberations beyond 
avoiding unfair selective disclosure,396 the new Fed policy reduces that 
risk as well. 
5. CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENTS WITH NON-USE COMPONENTS  
Regulation FD permits a corporate executive to selectively disclose 
material nonpublic information to securities analysts, institutional 
investors, and other persons who expressly agree—either orally or in 
writing—to maintain the disclosed information in confidence.397 
Although SEC Rule 10b5-2 provides that confidentiality agreements 
create a duty of trust or confidence for purposes of the misappropriation 
theory of insider trading,398 many securities issuers now include a non-
use component that specifically obliges the recipient not to trade 
securities on the basis of that information.399 
 
information about issues of clear public concern for all to see, rather than passively 
waiting for FOIA requests to open a window on their activities”).  
 393. Susan Pulliam, NY Fed Opens up Its Discussions with Banks, WALL ST. 
J., Dec. 3, 2011, at A4.  
 394. Id. 
 395. See Jon Hilsenrath & Luca Di Leo, Fed Will Detail Rate Plans, Easing 
Market Guesswork, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 4, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052970203462304577138850741089974.html (“Under the plan, the Fed 
will publish a range of forecasts for interest rates among the central bank’s 17 
individual policy makers—including five board governors and 12 regional Fed bank 
presidents.”). 
 396. See id. (“Mr. Bernanke wants to inject more clarity into how the Fed 
makes decisions about the direction of rates, believing such guidance will reduce public 
uncertainty about the Fed and give it more scope to manage the economy.”). 
 397. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(1)(iv) (2012). 
 398. See § 240.10b5-2(b)(1) (2012). 
 399. See JAMES T. ROTHWELL, PIPEs Enforcement Actions, CORP. L. & 
PRACT. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES (2012) (“[I]f you want the recipient not to trade, 
you had better be specific. The safest approach, of course, is to seek a written 
contractual standstill from recipients.”); supra note 334 and accompanying text 
(discussing the district court’s decision in SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. 
Tex. 2009)). 
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Federal officials regularly employ confidentiality agreements with 
a non-use component in their interactions with individuals and entities 
outside the government who are serving as contractors. Specifically, 
government contractors typically sign agreements that prohibit the 
contractor and its affiliates from “[u]sing or releasing nonpublic 
information received under the contract except under limited 
conditions.”400 Moreover, to guard against organizational conflicts of 
interest that would arise if nonpublic information were used in 
competitive bidding situations, government contractors routinely set up 
firewalls “to ensure that the personnel preparing a contractor’s proposal 
do not have access to nonpublic information that the contractor obtained 
in the performance of a related contract.”401 
Using the model employed for federal contracting, other recipients 
of the government’s material nonpublic information could also be asked 
for assurances of confidentiality and non-use. If community college 
officials, for example, wish to discuss information that the DOE is not 
yet prepared to release publicly, the meeting could begin with a 
statement by a DOE official that the information is not to be used for 
securities trading, and that a confidentiality promise and nonuse 
agreement are preconditions for continuing. Once those assurances are 
given, DOE officials should then attempt to identify the nonpublic 
information they convey, so that the community college officials are put 
on notice as to what disclosures must be retained in confidence.  
Senior agency officials and congressional officials should also 
make greater use of confidentiality agreements with nonuse components 
in the context of private meetings with political intelligence consultants, 
as well as hedge fund managers and other investors, whose insight and 
guidance are being sought on issues of policy. Then, if a hedge fund or 
other investor trades securities while the agreement is still in place, or 
if political consultants subject to an agreement share that information 
with traders, the SEC or DOJ could pursue that person under the 
misappropriation theory of insider trading: the nonuse and 
confidentiality agreement creates the relationship of trust and 
confidence that gives rise to a disclosure duty under Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5.402  
 
 400. Keith R. Szeliga, Conflict and Intrigue in Government Contracts: A Guide 
to Identifying and Mitigating Organizational Conflicts of Interest, 35 PUB. CONT. L.J. 
639, 647 (2006). 
 401. Id. at 665. See generally Kathleen Clark, Ethics for an Outsourced 
Government (Wash. Univ. in St. Louis Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 
11-05-0, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1840629. 
 402. See § 240.10b5-2(b)(1); Cuban, 634 F. Supp. at 728; supra text 
accompanying notes 333–334. 
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6. ADDITIONAL PRECAUTIONS FOR MARKET-SENSITIVE DATA 
Several sectors of the government already go to great lengths to 
ensure that the release of market-sensitive data to the public is handled 
in a way that is fair to all investors. Some of these procedures were 
adopted in response to scandals involving leaks by executive agency 
employees. Recall that, to prevent a reoccurrence of a 1905 scandal, 
the USDA adopted strict security measures that protect crop data.403 
More recently, in response to SEC and DOJ concerns in 2007 about 
possible leakages, the Department of Labor (DOL) and several other 
agencies reinforced their procedures to prevent the premature release of 
key market-sensitive statistics, such as the monthly Consumer Price 
Index (CPI), gas prices, home sales, and the unemployment rate.404 
This data is kept inside a lock-up room with the explicit understanding 
that that the data will be embargoed until a designated time.405 As the 
DOL’s Press Lock-ups Policy Statement explains, “lock-ups provide 
press the opportunity to read, review, ask questions about and compose 
coverage of the data.”406  
A recent dispute between the DOL and several news organizations 
over access to the lock-up room is instructive. Upon learning that 
certain little-known news organizations were effectively operating as 
conduits for hedge funds, the DOL took steps to revoke their press 
credentials.407 DOL officials were concerned because securities trades 
were being placed from inside the lock-up room immediately upon the 
embargo’s expiration and thus before the market as a whole had an 
opportunity to access the information.408 Other organizations were 
asked to replace their computers in the lock-up room with new 
computers that could not be linked automatically to specialized trading 
models.409 The DOL took these steps to ensure that its data was released 
to “primarily journalistic” news organizations, which would 
 
 403. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.  
 404. See John H. Cushman, Jr., Guarding the Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 
2012, at B1 (reporting that the DOL guards the monthly CPI “with launch-code 
secrecy, a precaution against anyone who might try to take advantage of an accidental 
or a surreptitious leak to gain an insider’s edge in the financial markets, turning 
milliseconds into millions”). 
 405. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR PRESS LOCK-UPS POLICY STATEMENT AND NEWS 
ORGANIZATION AGREEMENT (2012), available at www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/ 
opa/OPA20120672.pdf. 
 406. Id. 
 407. Cushman, supra note 404.  
 408. Id. 
 409. Id. (observing that, because many hedge funds use computerized trading 
programs that are determined in advance, the very act of communicating information to 
a hedge fund computer may instantaneously result in a trade).  
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immediately share the unembargoed data with the general public or a 
broad base of subscribers.410 Other agencies, however, may not be as 
willing as the DOL to venture down the politically perilous path of 
determining the bona fides of news organization seeking access to 
lock-up rooms or briefings.411  
Although some executive agencies take extreme precautions in 
connection with the release of highly market-sensitive government data, 
it is often the case that public disclosure of government information 
need not be synchronized in so exact a manner, particularly if 
significant cost to taxpayers or impairment of government functions 
will result. For example, the Department of Transportation (DOT) 
probably does not need to take extraordinary measures to ban cell 
phones, Blackberries, and handheld computers from the press room 
when it announces a new policy initiative or the award of a significant 
government contract. On the other hand, agency staff should not talk 
about such developments in the hallways in the days or hours before a 
public announcement at a press conference.  
Whenever market-moving government information is initially 
made public, there will always be some securities traders who are lucky 
 
 410. Id. The DOL identified “Need to Know News,” a small enterprise owned 
by the German exchange, as an example of an organization whose “data goes directly 
from the lock-ups to specialized trading programs.” Id. The DOL explained that Need 
to Know News was not “primarily journalistic” and did not “disseminate their 
information to a wide audience.” Id.  
 411. The Treasury Department is another agency that often embargos certain 
market-sensitive information announced in press conferences. A 2001 incident reminds 
that the misuse of embargoed information may be prosecuted as securities fraud. The 
incident involved a political consultant who ultimately pled guilty to charges that he 
illegally tipped embargoed T-Bill information to bond traders at Goldman Sachs and 
other investment firms. See Davis, Litigation Release No. 18,322, 80 SEC Docket 
2952 (Sept. 4, 2003); SEC v. Nothern, 598 F. Supp. 2d 167, 177 (D. Mass. 2009) 
(holding that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that the consultant had 
illegally misappropriated the T-Bill information and that the tippee-defendant knew or 
shown have known that the consultant was breaching a duty of trust and confidence 
which he owed to the Treasury Department). Constitutional questions, however, might 
arise if a news reporter, as opposed to a consultant, were prosecuted for the premature 
publication of embargoed information. Cf. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 528 
(2001) (observing that New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) 
(per curiam), “raised, but did not resolve, the question whether, in cases where 
information has been acquired unlawfully by a newspaper or by a source, government 
may ever punish not only the unlawful acquisition, but the ensuing publication as well” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714 (holding 
that the New York Times could publish portions of a classified Department of Defense 
study of United States-Vietnam relations and the conduct of the Vietnam War); 
Geoffrey R. Stone, WikiLeaks and the First Amendment, 64 FED. COMM. L.J. 477, 
487–89 (2012) (discussing the circumstances under which the government can 
constitutionally punish the publication or public dissemination of classified 
information).  
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enough to act on it first, whether due to happenstance or because they 
had trading programs already in place.412 The most relevant 
consideration for an FGD regime, however, is whether any person’s 
trading advantage results from favoritism on the part of an executive 
agency, congressional office, or its staff that could have been avoided 
without creating an unreasonable cost to taxpayers or undue 
interference with the agency or office’s principal functions.  
7. CONSULTATIONS WITH AND REFERRALS TO THE SEC 
   When Congress created the SEC in 1934, it empowered the 
agency to regulate the ongoing disclosure practices of SEC reporting 
companies.413 Nothing in this charge, however, vests the SEC with the 
authority to regulate the ongoing disclosure practices at other executive 
agencies or in the legislative or judicial branches of the federal 
government. Of course, to the extent that officials in any of the three 
branches commit fraud “in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security,” Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 provide a basis for both civil 
and criminal liability.414 And if the elected nature of their offices 
provided a reason to doubt that basis for members of Congress (or the 
President and Vice President), the STOCK Act expressly removes that 
doubt.415  
Although the SEC should not embroil itself in matters outside its 
regulatory mission, its expertise on disclosure issues is an important 
resource that could be tapped by other executive agencies or by officials 
in Congress and the courts. Executive, judicial, and congressional 
officials should be encouraged to consult with the SEC on issues 
relating to fairer government disclosure. Beyond that, if executive, 
congressional, or judicial officials have suspicions about the possibility 
of fraudulent tipping or trading in securities, a referral to the SEC 
should be made immediately.  
 
 412. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 666 n.27 (1983) (“[A]s market values 
fluctuate and investors act on inevitably incomplete or incorrect information, there 
always are winners and losers.”).  
 413. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 13(a), 73 Stat. 881 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2006)). 
 414. See § 10(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10(b) (2012). 
 415. See STOCK Act, Pub. L. No. 112-105, §§ 4(b), 9(b), 126 Stat. 291 (to be 
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(g) to (h)). Section 4(b) refers expressly to members of 
Congress and Section 9(b)(2) specifies that the term “executive branch employee” 
includes the President and the Vice President. Id.  
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CONCLUSION 
Securities trading on the basis of selectively disclosed material 
nonpublic information allows investors to profit from access to 
knowledgeable sources—whether the source is situated inside a publicly 
traded company or inside the federal government. The selective 
disclosure to outsiders, however, is unlikely to conflict with the duty of 
trust and confidence that is owed to the sources of the information 
because the insider usually has an apparently legitimate reason for 
communicating the information. Sharing the information, and trading 
securities based on that information, thus would not violate the insider 
trading prohibitions arising under the federal securities laws. The 
selective disclosure and trading nonetheless undermines confidence in 
the fairness and integrity of securities markets.  
Curtailing the problem of selective disclosure in the private sector 
required looking beyond Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The solution 
involved regulating the timing and manner of disclosures by corporate 
insiders, rather than the conduct of outsiders who gather and trade on 
the basis of those disclosures. The SEC embraced this approach in 
Regulation FD for publicly traded companies and corporate insiders 
have been adhering to it for more than a decade.  
In the wake of the tremendous momentum and bipartisan efforts 
that led to the passage of the STOCK Act, attention can now turn to 
curtailing the problem of selective disclosure by federal officials in the 
public sector. A Fairer Government Disclosure (FGD) regime would 
boost investor confidence in securities markets and in the integrity of 
government itself. But the measures we propose are only a starting 
point. There is more study and work to be done—both by government 
officials and academics (including ourselves)—as to how an FGD 
regime can best be implemented and enforced.  
